In Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40, Brown sued Kennard for abuse of process because Kennard allegedly caused a writ of execution to be levied upon Brown's " 'categorically exempt funds,' i.e., Social Security retirement benefits and personal retirement benefits." (Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) In addition, Brown alleged that Kennard refused to release the levy after being notified of the exempt status of the funds. (Ibid.) Brown further alleged that the judgment Kennard sought to enforce was not final. (Ibid.) Moreover, Brown's complaint claimed that the purported judgment had been entered in an action to which Brown was not even a party. (Id. at pp. 43, 44.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had properly sustained Kennard's demurrer without leave to amend because Kennard's conduct was protected by the litigation privilege. (Id. at pp. 43, 46-51.) In Brown v. Kennard, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant "abused process by causing a wrongful writ of execution to be levied upon his 'categorically exempt funds,' i.e., Social Security retirement benefits and personal retirement benefits." (Id. at p. 43, ) Defendant demurred on the ground that the abuse of process claim was barred by the section 47(b) litigation privilege. The plaintiff argued that the act of levying was a noncommunicative act and therefore not subject to the privilege. (Id. at p. 49.) The appellate court disagreed, stating that the plaintiff was "claiming a 'distinction without a difference.' The act of applying for a writ is privileged. The privilege extends to torts arising from the privileged statement or publication. As such, not only does the privilege protect the application for a writ of execution, it also extends to the act of carrying out the directive of the writ. To hold otherwise would effectively strip the litigation privilege of its purpose." (Id. at p. 50, ) The court therefore determined that the cause of action for abuse of process was barred by the litigation privilege. (Id. at p. 51.) The court explained the California courts "recognized long ago that a wrongful levy may constitute an abuse of process." (Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 46.) It also discussed several more recent cases holding such efforts are " 'logically and legally related to the realization of a litigation objective--that is, collection of a judgment,' " and, as such, are privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). (Brown, at p. 48) The appellate court agreed with the reasoning of these cases. "Undeniably . . . enforcement proceedings are an extension of the judicial process and are related to the realization of a litigation objective." (Brown, at p. 49.) The court went on to observe the "recent decisions that invoke the litigation privilege and curtail the derivative tort remedy of abuse of process arising from allegedly wrongful levies recognize, importantly, that the plaintiff (the one being levied on) is not left remediless." (Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.) For example, a party threatened with or aggrieved by allegedly wrongful execution efforts can promptly post an undertaking or seek a writ of supersedeas precluding any enforcement efforts, file a motion to quash a wrongful writ of execution, or file a motion for a turnover order to recover property that has been seized. (Ibid.) As part of his argument on appeal, plaintiff claimed "that the levy was neither a statement nor a communication within the litigation privilege. . . . Specifically, plaintiff contended that his abuse of process claim did not rely on the communicative act of applying for a writ of execution . . . ." (Id. at pp. 49-50.) He instead maintained "that his abuse of process claim arose from the wrongful levy effected pursuant to the writ, including the interference with his property rights and the levy upon exempt property." (Id. at p. 50.) The Third District rejected this argument: "The act of applying for a writ is privileged. The privilege extends to torts arising from the privileged statement or publication. As such, not only does the privilege protect the application for the writ of execution, it also extends to the act of carrying out the directive of the writ. To hold otherwise would effectively strip the litigation privilege of its purpose." (Ibid.)