In Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, a married man executed his integrated estate plan, which consisted of a will and an inter vivos trust. The trust agreement stated that all property in the trust was the husband's separate property. To discourage litigation over the trust and its distribution scheme, the husband inserted a no contest clause in the trust instrument. The no contest clause in Burch provided, in pertinent part: "'In the event that any beneficiary under this Trust . . . seeks to obtain in any proceeding in any court an adjudication that this Trust or any of its provisions . . . is void, or seeks otherwise to void, nullify or set aside this Trust or any of its provisions, then the right of that person to take any interest given to him or her by this Trust shall be determined as it would have been determined had such person predeceased the execution of this trust instrument without issue.'" (Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th 246, 256.) After the husband's death, his wife petitioned the probate court to determine whether she could, without violating the no contest clause, litigate her rights as a surviving spouse to certain assets in the trust under California community property law and under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.). (Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th 246, 251.) The wife was seeking to recharacterize assets specifically included in the trust as the husband's separate property. She had to elect to either take under the trust or assert her community property rights independent of the trust. The wife's position was that "public policy weighed in favor of deeming a no contest clause unenforceable against a surviving spouse who asserts community interests in estate property. She pointed out there is a strong public policy that favors fair dealing between spouses with respect to marital assets." (Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th 246, 264.) The Supreme Court found that the proposed state and federal actions would trigger the no contest clause. The Supreme Court stated that the trustor "intended to put his surviving spouse to an election between taking the distribution provided for her under the trust, or alternatively, renouncing that distribution and taking against the trust estate pursuant to her independent legal rights." (Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th 246, 257.) The Court held that where a trustor had expressed the intent to dispose of specific property and had described that property in a schedule attached as an exhibit to the trust, his wife's claim to that property under community property laws triggered the no contest clause of the trust. (Id. at pp. 254-258.) It did not matter that the decedent might have been mistaken about the character of the property described in the trust; the specification of that property, along with directions to dispose of all of it under the provisions of the trust, showed that decedent intended his wife to either take the distribution provided for her under the trust or renounce that distribution and pursue her independent legal rights. (Id. at p. 257.) The Supreme Court found the proposed state and federal actions would trigger the no-contest clause, setting forth the relevant inquiry as follows: "Following the rule of strict construction , we must ascertain from the trust provisions whether Frank unequivocally intended that Marlene would forfeit the distribution provided for her under the trust instrument in the event that she decides to pursue her interests as a surviving spouse against the trust estate. If this intention plainly appears, then it must be concluded that Marlene's proposed actions would trigger the no contest clause." ( Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 256.) The Supreme Court found that it was clear Frank intended his property to be transferred subject to the distribution scheme in the trust. It was also clear "from the trust terms that the trustor intended to dispose of the trust estate in whole, and that he intended to put his surviving spouse to an election between taking the distribution provided for her under the trust, or alternatively, renouncing that distribution and taking against the trust estate pursuant to her independent legal rights. This intention appears from the declaration in the recitals that the property subject to the trust is and is to remain the trustor's 'separate property.'" ( Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 257.) The Supreme Court quoted Witkin with approval: "'If the testator refers to the property bequeathed or devised in general terms without identifying it as separate or community, it may be inferred that he intended only to dispose of his own interest (his separate property and one-half the community property), and no election is necessary, no matter how liberal the provision is for the wife. ' (12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Wills and Probate, 55, pp. 93-94.) On the other hand, 'if the testator declares that all the property is his separate property, thus clearly indicating a belief that he is disposing of the entire estate, election is required. "It is of no concern that he was mistaken in his belief that the wife had no community interest in the property devised. His manifest intention to devise the estate as an entirety, and irrespective of any right which might be asserted on behalf of the marital community, is the controlling factor." ' (12 Witkin, supra, 55, p. 94.)" ( Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 257.) In sum, Marlene became Frank Burch's fifth wife. He executed a will and inter vivos trust as his integrated estate plan. He inserted a no-contest clause similar to the one in this case. The trust agreement stated that all property in the trust was Frank's separate property. Marlene was generously provided for in the trust. "After Frank's death, Marlene petitioned the probate court to determine whether she may, without violating the no contest clause, proceed with plans to litigate her rights as a surviving spouse to certain assets in the trust estate under California's community property laws and under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ...." ( Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 251; Prob. Code, 21320, subd. (a).) The settlor declared that property subject to the trust was his separate property; the trust provided for division of the residue into six separate trusts, for his wife and other relatives, and used a very broad no contest clause (similar to the one in the Evans trust). Some of the property that was transferred to the trust, and that the trustor declared to be his separate property, included assets in which his wife had a community property interest, as well as pension plan death benefits to which she was entitled, as surviving spouse. After the trustor's death, his wife proposed to file a complaint seeking the return of her property from the trust estate, and sought a ruling as to whether she could do so without violating the no contest clause. The court posed the question this way: "We must ascertain from these trust provisions whether Frank unequivocally intended that Marlene would forfeit the distribution provided for her under the trust instrument in the event that she decides to pursue her interests as a surviving spouse against the trust estate. If this intention plainly appears, then it must be concluded that Marlene's proposed actions would trigger the no contest clause." (Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 256.) Burch found it "reasonably clear from the trust terms" that the trustor "intended to put his surviving spouse to an election between taking the distribution provided for her under the trust, or alternatively, renouncing that distribution and taking against the trust estate pursuant to her independent legal rights." (Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 257.) Indeed, the trustor's intentions were clear "even though the disputed assets were not listed in the trust instrument." (Id. at p. 258.) The court held that her proposed action (litigation of an independent right to the property) would contest the express terms of the trust (the declaration that all trust property was decedent's separate property). ( Id. at p. 263.) The court explained that where the trustor has expressed the intent to dispose of specific property, indicating that he or she is disposing of all of it, an election by the beneficiary claiming the independent right to that property is required. It does not matter that the decedent might be mistaken about the character of the property. The specification of particular property along with directions to dispose of all of it under the will or trust evidences the decedent's intent to put the beneficiary to an election. ( Burch v. George, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 257-258, citing 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) The Court found that the decedent intended "to put his surviving spouse to an election between taking the distribution provided for her under the trust, or alternatively, renouncing that distribution and taking against the trust estate pursuant to her independent legal rights. This intention appears from the declaration in the recital that the property subject to the trust is and is to remain the trustor's 'separate property.' " ( Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 246, 257 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 866 P.2d 92 (Burch).) The court found that this interpretation was supported by the extrinsic evidence offered by the trustee: "This evidence is uncontroverted that the husband transferred the disputed assets to the trust, that he intended that the trust dispose of these assets, and that any assertion of independent rights to these assets by the wife would trigger the no contest clause." ( Id. at p. 258.)