In Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, the court of appeal dealt with the plaintiff's claim that the trial court misapplied section 527.6 when, in response to cross-petitions for injunctions under that section, it ordered her not to park on a driveway easement but permitted the defendants to do so. (Byers v. Cathcart, at pp. 809-810.) The evidence before the trial court on the parties' petitions mostly related to the validity and scope of the easement rather than issues of harassment. (Id. at p. 809.) The court of appeal rejected the use of section 527.6 in this particular case, explaining that the section 527.6 injunction was of limited duration -- three years -- ( 527.6, subd. (d)) and thus could not finally determine the parties respective rights and duties to the easement's use as the trial court effectively sought to do. Under these facts, the court reasoned: "The lack of finality of a section 527.6 order underscores that section 527.6 was never intended to provide an expedited procedure for resolving real property disputes." (Byers v. Cathcart, at p. 810.) It also observed that, given the limited scope of the antiharassment order, section 527.6 "does not allow for final resolution of disputed rights." (Byers v. Cathcart, at p. 812.) The Court reversed an order enjoining the plaintiff from parking along the side of a driveway that she had an easement to use. The court found no evidence the parking was done for the purpose of annoying the defendants, as opposed to the legitimate purpose of storing the car when it was not in use. It also found that "potentially complex issues of real estate law such as rights and duties pursuant to an easement cannot properly be resolved pursuant to the summary procedures of section 527.6." (Byers v. Cathcart, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808, 813.) The appellate court held that the defendant's conduct in parking a car along the side of a driveway to which she had an easement, the scope of which was disputed, was a legitimate activity that could not be enjoined. The court reasoned: "The term 'harassment' is narrowly defined in section 527.6. Among other aspects of the definition, the complained-of conduct must have 'no legitimate purpose' in order to constitute 'harassment.' ( 527.6, subd. (b).) The complained-of conduct which generated this appeal was parking a car along the side of a driveway." ( Id. at p. 807.) "Parking generally is not conduct having 'no legitimate purpose.' There is no evidence here that the parking was done for the purpose of annoying defendants as opposed to the purpose of storing a vehicle between periods of use. The no-parking provision of the injunction was therefore beyond the scope of section 527.6." ( Id. at p. 808.) The court explained that in order to constitute harassment under section 527.6, subdivision (b), "the complained-of conduct must have 'no legitimate purpose' . . . ." The Byers court concluded that the trial court in that case had erred in issuing an injunction pursuant to 527.6 because one could not say that the conduct at issue -- parking along the side of a driveway -- served no legitimate purpose. The court reasoned: "The complained-of conduct which generated this appeal was parking a car along the side of a driveway. . . . We therefore focus on whether, under the facts of this case, plaintiff could properly be enjoined pursuant to section 527.6 from parking along the side of the driveway."Plaintiff has an easement to use the driveway. The scope of the use authorized by the easement is in dispute. It can hardly be disputed, however, that parking a car is a legitimate necessity. Parking generally is not conduct having 'no legitimate purpose.' There is no evidence here that the parking was done for the purpose of annoying defendants as opposed to the purpose of storing a vehicle between periods of use. The no-parking provision of the injunction was therefore beyond the scope of section 527.6." (Byers, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808.