CALCRIM 1191 - Interpretation
In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, the California Supreme Court held that the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was constitutional.
The version of CALCRIM No. 1191, given to the jury in this case, contains substantially similar language to that in the version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 which was approved by the Supreme Court in Reliford.
In People v. Schnabel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 87, the appellate court rejected the defendant's constitutional challenge to CALCRIM No. 1191, based on Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, stating:
"As to defendant's challenge to the instruction, it is based on his assertion that the instruction on the use of prior sex offenses 'wholly swallowed the "beyond reasonable doubt" requirement.' the California Supreme Court has rejected this argument in upholding the constitutionality of the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01.
The version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 considered in Reliford is similar in all material respects to . . . CALCRIM No. 1191 (which was given here) in its explanation of the law on permissive inferences and the burden of proof. We are in no position to reconsider the Supreme Court's holding in Reliford, and by analogy to Reliford, we reject defendant's argument regarding the jury instruction on use of his prior sex offenses."
In People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480, the appellate court upheld the validity of CALCRIM No. 1191, stating:
"Although the instruction considered in Reliford was the older CALJIC No. 2.50.01, there is no material difference in the manner in which each of the instructions allows the jury to conclude from the prior conduct evidence that the defendant was disposed to commit sexual offenses and, therefore, likely committed the current offenses. CALCRIM No. 1191 cautions the jury that it is not required to draw these conclusions and, in any event, such a conclusion is insufficient, alone, to support a conviction. Based on Reliford, we therefore reject defendant's contention that the instruction violated his due process rights."