In California, CALJIC No. 2.15 has evolved from cases holding that proof of possession of recently stolen property is insufficient by itself to support a guilty verdict as to a theft-related offense. (See McFarland, supra, 58 Cal. 2d at pp. 754-758, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449; People v. Clark (1953) 122 Cal. App. 2d 342, 345 265 P.2d 43.) It is a permissive, cautionary instruction which inures to a criminal defendant's benefit by warning the jury not to infer guilt merely from a defendant's conscious possession of recently stolen goods, without at least some corroborating evidence tending to show the defendant's guilt. (See People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 859 P.2d 673 (Johnson); People v. Gamble (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 446, 452-455 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451 (Gamble).) Such an inference of guilt has been held not to relieve the prosecution of its burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( McFarland, supra, 58 Cal. 2d at pp. 756-757, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449; Gamble, supra, 22 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 453-454, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451; Anderson, supra, 210 Cal. App. 3d. at pp. 430-432, 258 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451.) The prosecutor's use of this permissive inference comports with due process unless there is no rational way for the jury to make the logical connection which the presumption permits. ( Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224-2225, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777; see also Gamble, supra, 22 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 454-455, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451.)