In 2005, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 138 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), which amended Gov. Code, 17556, subd. (f), to provide that the state need not reimburse a local government if a statute imposes duties that are necessary to implement, reasonably within the scope of, or expressly included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide or local election. Assembly Bill No. 138 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) changed the wording of Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f) with respect to ballot measure mandates. The 2005 provision stated that costs are not reimbursable if "the statute or executive order imposes duties that are necessary to implement, reasonably within the scope of, or expressly included in a ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide or local election. This subdivision applies regardless of whether the statute or executive order was enacted or adopted before or after the date on which the ballot measure was approved by the voters." (Stats. 2005, ch. 72, 7; see Gov. Code, 17556, subdivision (f).) Government Code section 17556 states: "The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds any one of the following: "(a) the claim is submitted by a local agency or school district that requested legislative authority for that local agency or school district to implement the program specified in the statute, and that statute imposes costs upon that local agency or school district requesting the legislative authority. a resolution from the governing body or a letter from a delegated representative of the governing body of a local agency or school district that requests authorization for that local agency or school district to implement a given program shall constitute a request within the meaning of this subdivision. "(b) the statute or executive order affirmed for the state a mandate that had been declared existing law or regulation by action of the courts. "(c) the statute or executive order imposes a requirement that is mandated by a federal law or regulation and results in costs mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs that exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation. This subdivision applies regardless of whether the federal law or regulation was enacted or adopted prior to or after the date on which the state statute or executive order was enacted or issued. "(d) the local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service. "(e) the statute, executive order, or an appropriation in a Budget Act or other bill provides for offsetting savings to local agencies or school districts that result in no net costs to the local agencies or school districts, or includes additional revenue that was specifically intended to fund the costs of the state mandate in an amount sufficient to fund the cost of the state mandate. "(f) the statute or executive order imposes duties that are necessary to implement, reasonably within the scope of, or expressly included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide or local election. This subdivision applies regardless of whether the statute or executive order was enacted or adopted before or after the date on which the ballot measure was approved by the voters. "(g) the statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a crime or infraction, or changed the penalty for a crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to the enforcement of the crime or infraction." Assembly Bill No. 138 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) repealed the Government Code provisions that the Commission had found resulted in reimbursable costs mandated by the state. (Stats. 2005, ch. 72, 11, 13.) It then reenacted the provisions verbatim, except that it added a subdivision to each provision stating, "This section is necessary to implement and reasonably within the scope of Proposition 59." (Stats. 2005, ch. 72, 12, 14; Gov. Code, 54954.2, subd. (c); see Gov. Code, 54957.1, subd. (f).) Assembly Bill No. 138 directed the Commission to "set-aside all decisions, reconsiderations, and parameters and guidelines on the Open Meetings Act (CSM-4257) and Brown Act Reform (CSM-4469) test claims," retroactive to the effective date of Assembly Bill No. 138. (Stats. 2005, ch. 72, 17(b).) In Assembly Bill No. 138 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) and corresponding legislation, the Legislature directed the Commission to set aside, in one instance, and reconsider, in the others, its decisions on the test claims at issue here. The trial court decided that the direction to reconsider test claims "is procedural only; it operates, or can be construed to operate prospectively only; it does not dictate the result; and, therefore, it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine." As for the Legislature's direction to the Commission to set aside a test claim decision, however, the trial court concluded that it violated the separation of powers doctrine because it did not merely require the Commission to reconsider them. This is the extent of the distinction identified by the trial court.