"An unlawful killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, even if unintentional, is at least voluntary manslaughter." (People v. Garcia (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 18, 31.) In People v. Garcia (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 18, the defendant complained that the trial court improperly failed to instruct his jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling. It held that "an unlawful killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, even if unintentional, is at least voluntary manslaughter." (Garcia, at p. 22.) Because Garcia had assaulted his victim with a deadly weapon, an inherently dangerous felony, the trial court properly concluded the evidence would not support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter and therefore did not err in not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. (Ibid.) In People v. Cameron (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 591, the binding principle was that voluntary manslaughter required an intent to kill, and thus in the absence of an intent to kill, the killing, a fortiori, had to have been an involuntary manslaughter. (Cameron, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 604.) However, in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101 and its companion, People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, the Supreme Court held that voluntary manslaughter did not require an intent to kill. Thereafter, Garcia held that an unlawful and unintentional killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony is at least voluntary manslaughter. In Garcia, the victim and the defendant were involved in a confrontation. The victim moved toward (or " 'lunged' at") the defendant, who was holding a shotgun. The defendant, concerned the victim might try to take the shotgun, swung at the victim with the butt of the gun to make the victim back up, and the gun struck the victim in the face. This caused the victim to fall and hit his head on the sidewalk, and later die from the injuries sustained in the fall. (Garcia, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 22-23, 25.) The defendant asserted he did not mean to hit the victim in the face or to kill him. The jury was instructed on the crimes of murder and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and the jury acquitted the defendant of murder but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at pp. 23-26.) On appeal, the defendant in Garcia claimed the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of murder. The defendant argued that instruction was required because there was substantial evidence the killing "was committed without malice and without either an intent to kill or conscious disregard for human life and, therefore, was neither murder nor voluntary manslaughter." (Garcia, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) The argument in Garcia was limited to whether evidence showing an unintentional killing without implied malice during commission of an inherently dangerous felony could support an instruction for involuntary manslaughter. Garcia rejected that claim, stating an "unlawful killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, even if unintentional, is at least voluntary manslaughter." (Id. at p. 31.) The italicized language was dictum and contained no specification of the circumstances, if any, under which the killing might be voluntary manslaughter and under which it would be a greater offense. (Ibid.) Voluntary manslaughter has traditionally been limited to two scenarios: (1) when the killer acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 109; 192, subd. (a)); and (2) the theory of imperfect self-defense; i.e., when the killer acts with an honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury (People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674; People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 88-89). In People v. Garcia (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 18, the Second Appellate District suggested a third possible scenario for voluntary manslaughter: an unlawful killing, committed without malice aforethought, that occurs during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. (Garcia, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 31-32.) In that case, the defendant struck the victim in the face with the butt of a shotgun, causing the victim to fall, hit his head on the sidewalk, and die. (Id. at p. 22.) The defendant said that the victim lunged at him and "he 'just reacted'" by jabbing or swinging the shotgun at the victim; he did not intend to hit the victim or to kill him. (Id. at p. 25.) The trial court instructed the jury on the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter (based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion and imperfect self-defense), but refused to instruct on involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at pp. 25-26.) He was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 23.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the court erred in denying his request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 24.) The Court of Appeal disagreed. (Id. at pp. 22, 32.) The court concluded that because the victim's "death did not occur in the commission of either a dangerous misdemeanor , or a lawful act in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection, it does not fall within the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter " (Id. at p. 32.) The court added that the killing was "properly classified as voluntary manslaughter . . . ." (Id. at p. 32.) The statements in Garcia regarding voluntary manslaughter must be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. (See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155; Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2.) " 'An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court's opinion but only "for the points actually involved and actually decided."' " (People v. Knoller, supra, at p. 155.) Significantly, the defendant in Garcia did not challenge the decision to give the voluntary manslaughter instruction or the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of voluntary manslaughter. The question of whether the defendant's actions constituted voluntary manslaughter was simply not presented to the Court of Appeal or necessary to its decision. It was enough to conclude, as the court did, that there was no substantial evidence to support the giving of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. (Garcia, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32-33.)