California Criminal Speedy Trial

"A defendant's statutory rights are '"'merely supplementary to and a construction of the Constitution. They do not carry the force of weight of constitutionally mandated imperatives."" ( In re Samano (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 984, 991.) In California, a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, is codified as follows. Generally a criminal defendant must be brought to trial within 60 days of the date of his or her arraignment. ( 1049.5 "In felony cases, the court shall set a date for trial which is within 60 days of the defendant's arraignment in the superior court unless, upon a showing of good cause as prescribed in Section 1050, the court lengthens the time.".) The trial court must dismiss an action "in a felony case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant's arraignment . . . ." ( 1382, subd. (a)(2).) ". . . the defendant's statutory right to speedy trial, is not without limitation. ( Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774 at pp. 781-782; see also Greenberger v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 487, 492-501 ("Greenberger").)" ( In re Samano, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.) "If the defendant is not . . . tried, as provided in Section 1382, and sufficient reason therefore is shown, the court may order the action to be continued from time to time . . . ." ( 1383; see also 1050, subd. (e) "upon a showing of good cause," the trial court may grant a continuance beyond the 60-day time limit..) A defendant may waive the 60-day trial requirement. ( 1382, subd. (a)(2) An action shall not be dismissed under subdivision (a)(2) of section 1382 "if either of the following circumstances exist: (A) the defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-day trial requirement. . . . If the defendant, after proper notice to all parties, later withdraws his or her waiver in the superior court, the defendant shall be brought to trial within 60 days of the date of that withdrawal. If a general time waiver is not expressly entered, subparagraph (B) shall apply. (B) the defendant requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day period. Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.".) ". . . Neither the convenience of the parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good cause." ( 1050, subd. (e).) However, "'a continuance granted at the request of counsel normally constitutes . . . good cause citation, at least in the absence of evidence showing . . . circumstances where counsel's request for a continuance is prompted only by the need to serve other clients and the defendant himself objects to the delay. " ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 852-853.) Moreover, "In any case in which two or more defendants are jointly charged in the same . . . information, and the court or magistrate, for good cause shown, continues the . . . trial of one or more defendants, the continuance shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to continue the remaining defendants' cases so as to maintain joinder. The court or magistrate shall not cause jointly charged cases to be severed due to the unavailability or unpreparedness of one or more defendants unless it appears to the court or magistrate that it will be impossible for all defendants to be available and prepared within a reasonable period of time." ( 1050.1.) "If the precipitating cause for trial delay is justifiable, such as codefendants' need to adequately prepare for trial, then the section 1098 joint trial mandate constitutes good cause to delay the trial of an objecting codefendant." (Greenberger, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 501; see also, Hollis v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 642, 646.) The trial court's decision to grant continuances under section 1382 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 852-853.) Moreover, "on appeal from a judgment of conviction a defendant asserting a statutory speedy trial claim must show that the delay caused prejudice . . . ." ( People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 769.) "'Once a defendant has been tried and convicted, the state Constitution in article VI, section 13, forbids reversal for nonprejudicial error,' and so on appeal from a judgment of conviction a defendant asserting a statutory speedy trial claim must show that the delay caused prejudice, even though the defendant would not be required to show prejudice on pretrial appellate review." ( Id. at p. 769.) After trial, it can be determined "whether material witnesses were missing or had poor memories or there was other prejudice caused by postcomplaint delay in the context of the case as a whole." ( Id. at pp. 769-770.) State Constitutional Speedy Trial Claim "For speedy trial claims under the state Constitution not based on statute, . . . a demonstration of prejudice is required whether the trial court determines the issue before or after trial or verdict, and the standard of review for a ruling on such a claim is the same whether appellate review occurs before or after judgment." (People v. Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 769, italics added.) Under the state constitution, a defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 755, 766.) Federal Constitutional Speedy Trial Claim "To determine whether federal speedy-trial rights were violated, courts apply a balancing test involving four factors: length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 603.) Under the federal constitution, "delay that is 'uncommonly long' triggers a presumption of prejudice, a defendant can establish a speedy trial claim under the Sixth Amendment without making an affirmative demonstration that the government's want of due diligence prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend against the charge." ( People v. Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 755, 766.)