Penal Code Section 954 provides in part: "An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, and if two or more accusatory pleadings are filed in such cases in the same court, the court may order them to be consolidated." Section 954 further provides that a court may exercise its discretion and order separate trials of different offenses or counts in the information "in the interest of justice and for good cause shown." ( 954.) In general, the law prefers consolidation of charges. (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771 (Soper); People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 939-940 (Bean).) " 'Joinder of related charges, whether in a single accusatory pleading or by consolidation of several accusatory pleadings, ordinarily avoids needless harassment of the defendant and the waste of public funds which result if the same general facts were to be tried in two or more separate trials , and in several respects separate trials would result in the same factual issues being presented in both trials.' " (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409, quoting People v. Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 655, overruled on another ground as noted in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13.) Consequently, when the statutory requirements for joinder are met, the burden is reversed and a defendant "must make a ' "clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion" ' " in denying severance. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, quoting Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220 (Alcala); see also Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 938.) "A trial court's denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling ' " ' "falls outside the bounds of reason." ' " ' " (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, quoting Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1222, fn. 11.) "In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under section 954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, 'we consider the record before the trial court when it made its ruling.' " (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, quoting Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220.) Under Penal Code section 954, "an accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately." However, even when the statutory requirements for permissive joinder are met, severance of the charges may be constitutionally required if joinder "would be so prejudicial that it would deny a defendant a fair trial." (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1243-1244.) Because the joinder of related charges, " 'whether in a single accusatory pleading or by consolidation of several accusatory pleadings, ordinarily avoids needless harassment of the defendant and the waste of public funds which may result if the same general facts were to be tried in two or more separate trials , and in several respects separate trials would result in the same factual issues being presented in both trials," the law prefers consolidation of charges. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409.) If the requirements for joinder under section 954 are met, a defendant must then make "a clear showing of potential prejudice" due to the consolidation of such properly joined counts to establish error in the denial of a motion to sever. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315.) Generally, the denial of a severance motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion and the ruling will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666.) Such an abuse of discretion may be found when the court's ruling " 'falls outside the bounds of reason.' " (Ibid.) "The propriety of a ruling on a motion to sever counts is judged by the information available to the court at the time the motion is heard." (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284.) " ' "The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried." ' " (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1315.) Whether joinder of properly joined counts would cause prejudice depends on the circumstances of each case, "but certain criteria have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial." (Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 639.) The denial of a severance motion "may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a 'weak' case has been joined with a 'strong' case, or with another 'weak' case, so that the 'spillover' effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. " (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172-173 (Sandoval), distinguished on another point in People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 390.) These criteria, however, are not "equally significant." (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1315.) " 'The first step in assessing whether a combined trial would have been prejudicial is to determine whether evidence on each of the joined charges would have been admissible . . . in separate trials on the others. If so, any inference of prejudice is dispelled.'Cross-admissibility suffices to negate prejudice, but is not essential for that purpose. Although " 'our Supreme Court has held that cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of prejudice, it has never held that the absence of cross-admissibility, by itself, sufficed to demonstrate prejudice.' " " (Id. at pp. 1315-1316.) Finally, "even if a trial court's severance or joinder ruling is correct at the time it was made, a reviewing court must reverse the judgment if the 'defendant shows that joinder actually resulted in "gross unfairness" amounting to a denial of due process.' " (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162.)