Duty "is an essential element" of the tort of negligence. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.) Duty "may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship." (Id. at p. 985.) The existence of a legal duty " ' "depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability." ' " (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552.) As provided by statute: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself." (Civ. Code, 1714, subd. (a).) The California Supreme Court expounded the "fundamental principle enunciated by" this provision more than four decades ago, in the seminal case of Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112. As the Rowland court explained, no exception to this statutory principle "should be made unless clearly supported by public policy." (Id. at p. 112.) "A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." (Id. at pp. 112-113; accord, Wiener, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) Rowland remains "the gold standard against which the imposition of common law tort liability in California is weighed by the courts in this state." (Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 401 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 12.) Courts thus continue to employ Rowland's " 'multi-element duty assessment in determining whether a particular defendant owed a tort duty to a given plaintiff.' " (Ibid.) These same concepts apply to premises liability claims. Generally speaking, "a landowner has a duty to act reasonably in the management of property 'in view of the probability of injury to others.' " (Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Assn., Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1453, quoting Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119.) "In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists" involves balancing the Rowland factors set forth above. (Wiener, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1145; accord, Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) "Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis." (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) "Once the burden and foreseeability have been independently assessed, they can be compared in determining the scope of the duty the court imposes on a given defendant." (Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 285; accord, Castaneda, at p. 1214.) "The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court." (Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1188.) "Under the provisions of the California Tort Claims Act, 'a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person,' except as otherwise specifically provided by statute. (Gov. Code, 820, subd. (a).) In addition, the Tort Claims Act further provides that 'a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against that employee,' unless 'the employee is immune from liability.' (Gov. Code, 815.2, subds. (a), (b).)" (Lugtu, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 715.) Because Officers McFarlane and Weber were unquestionably acting within the scope of their employment at the time of these events, Defendants' liability, if any, turns on ordinary principles of negligence law. (See id. at pp. 715-716.) "'"Actionable negligence is traditionally regarded as involving the following: (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury."' '"While breach of duty and proximate cause normally present factual questions, the existence of a legal duty in a given factual situation is a question of law for the courts to determine. "'" (Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202 (Seo) citing Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837-1838.) "'Duty is simply a shorthand expression for the sum total of policy considerations favoring a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to legal protection. ' " (Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1094 (Munoz).) In determining whether a party has a legal duty, "a distinction is drawn between claims of liability based upon misfeasance and those based upon nonfeasance. '"'Misfeasance exists when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention. . . .' "' Liability for misfeasance is based on the general duty of ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by one's conduct. Liability for nonfeasance is limited to situations in which there is a special relationship that creates a duty to act. 'The basic idea is often referred to as the "no duty to aid rule". . . . "As a rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another. A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to act."' " (Seo, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1202-1203; see also 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, 1038, p. 332.) " 'Negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others.' 'Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.' (Civ. Code, 1714, subd. (a).)" (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 396-397 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 834 P.2d 745 (Bily).) (2) Related to the concept of negligence is the tort law that a person is "ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a special relationship of custody or control." (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 293 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948.) "The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion. Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court." (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397.) "California courts have explicitly rejected the concept of universal duty. ' " 'It must not be forgotten that "duty" got into our law for the very purpose of combatting what was then feared to be a dangerous delusion ... viz., that the law might countenance legal redress for all foreseeable harm.' " ' Instead, whether to recognize a new 'legal wrong' or 'tort' is often governed by policy factors. In making these determinations, both the courts and the Legislature must weigh concepts of 'public policy,' as well as problems inherent in measuring loss, and 'floodgates' concerns, in addition to the traditional element of foreseeability." (The Mega Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1527 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 399.) In determining whether it is appropriate to impose a legal duty for which the law will authorize redress, Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (Rowland), "enumerates a number of considerations ... that have been taken into account by courts in various contexts ... : 'the major considerations are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.' " (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624 (italics added by Ballard) (Ballard), quoting Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) "The foreseeability of a particular kind of harm plays a very significant role in this calculus , but a court's task--in determining 'duty'--is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party." (Ballard, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 572-573, fn. 6.) 8 As further explained by the Ballard court, the concept of foreseeability of risk of harm in determining whether a duty should be imposed is to be distinguished from the concept of "'foreseeability' in two more focused, fact-specific settings" to be resolved by a trier of fact. (Ballard, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 573, fn. 6.) "First, the trier of fact may consider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining whether, in fact, the particular defendant's conduct was negligent in the first place. Second, foreseeability may be relevant to the trier of fact's determination of whether the defendant's negligence was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury." (Ibid.) In other words, "examining whether a legal duty exists and whether a particular defendant was negligent are not coterminus ... . Fulfilling the court's responsibility to determine if a legal duty exists necessarily requires consideration and balancing of sometimes competing public policies which may be irrelevant to the factual determination of whether the challenged conduct fell below the prevailing standard of care." (Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 265 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196.) "'Actionable negligence is traditionally regarded as involving the following: (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.' (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, 732, p. 60, and cases cited.) 'Under the duty approach to negligence, conduct is negligent when it creates an unreasonable risk of harm to some general class of persons. If the plaintiff is not within that class toward whom the defendant is negligent, the injury does not give rise to liability. (See Rest.2d, Torts 281.)' (6 Witkin, supra, 733, p. 61.) '... Every case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.' (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46; Civ. Code, 1714.) Exceptions to this rule may be justified only by clear public policy. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112.) 'While breach of duty and proximate cause normally present factual questions, the existence of a legal duty in a given factual situation is a question of law for the courts to determine. .' (Andrews v. Wells (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 533, 538.)" (Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837-1838.)