Voluntary manslaughter "is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice" "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." (Penal Code 192, subd. (a).) The distinguishing feature separating murder from manslaughter is that "murder includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice." (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460.) A "'"defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills nonetheless lacks malice ... when he acts in a 'sudden quarrel or heat of passion' , or ... kills in 'unreasonable self-defense.'"'" (Ibid.) "This is also true of a killer who, acting with conscious disregard for life and knowing that the conduct endangers the life of another, unintentionally but unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 104 (Lasko).) "'An intentional, unlawful homicide is "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion" , and is thus voluntary manslaughter , if the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a "provocation" sufficient to cause an "'ordinary person of average disposition ... to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than judgment.'"' No specific type of provocation is required, and 'the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any "'"violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion"'" other than revenge .'" (Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 108.) "The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim , or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim." (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583.) "Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 3, 6, or 11 years." ( 193, subd. (a).) Section 1170, subdivision (b) (section 1170(b)), provides: "When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court." Under section 1170(b), "a trial court is free to base an upper term sentence upon any aggravating circumstance that the court deems significant, subject to specific prohibitions. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(c) fact underlying an enhancement may not be used to impose the upper term unless the court strikes the enhancement; id., rule 4.420(d) fact that is an element of the crime may not be used to impose the upper term.) The court's discretion to identify aggravating circumstances is otherwise limited only by the requirement that they be 'reasonably related to the decision being made.' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.408(a).)" (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 848, (Sandoval).) "An aggravating circumstance is a fact that makes the offense 'distinctively worse than the ordinary.'" (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817.) The trial court's decision to impose an upper term is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.) "The trial court's sentencing discretion must be exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an 'individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.'" (Ibid.) "A trial court will abuse its discretion under the amended scheme if it relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision." (Ibid.) "Manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder, is an unlawful killing without malice." (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664; see 192.) "A defendant lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in 'limited, explicitly defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a "sudden quarrel or heat of passion" ( 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in "unreasonable self-defense"--the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense .'" (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108.) "'An intentional, unlawful homicide is "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion" ( 192, subd. (a)), and is thus voluntary manslaughter (ibid.), if the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a "provocation" sufficient to cause an "'ordinary person of average disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than judgment.'"' No specific type of provocation is required, and 'the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any "'"violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion"'" other than revenge .' (Ibid.) Thus, a person who intentionally kills as a result of provocation, that is, 'upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,' lacks malice and is guilty not of murder but of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter." (People v. Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 108.) "Provocation can arise as a result of a series of events over time . . . ." (People v. Kanawyer (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1245.) However, whether arising immediately or as a result of a series of events, "'if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter . . . .'" (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163; see People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 868 "'if sufficient time has elapsed for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing is murder, not manslaughter'"; Kanawyer, at p. 1244 killing must be "'"suddenly as a response to the provocation, and not belatedly as revenge or punishment"'".) To assess a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case, "we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict--i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. 'Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. ' A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support"' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)