Workers' compensation ordinarily provides the exclusive remedy for an injury sustained by an employee in the course of employment and compensable under the workers' compensation law. (Lab. Code, 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a); Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812-813 (Vacanti).) The workers' compensation exclusivity rule also encompasses any injury " 'collateral to or derivative of' " an injury compensable under the workers' compensation law. (Vacanti, supra, at p. 813.) An injury is compensable under the workers' compensation law only if the statutory conditions of compensation exist and the injury involves a physical or emotional injury to the person. (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 813-814; Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 752-753.) "Only injuries 'to the worker's person, as opposed to his property,' are compensable. " (Vacanti, supra, at p. 814.) A workplace injury that does not involve physical or emotional injury to the person and that is not collateral to or derivative of such an injury is not compensable under the workers' compensation law, so the exclusivity remedy rule does not apply. (Ibid.) Thus, for example, the exclusivity rule does not apply to an action to recover economic or contract damages incurred independent of any compensable workplace injury. (Ibid.; Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 501.) Moreover, the workers' compensation exclusivity rule applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the "compensation bargain." (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812.) The exclusivity rule is based on the "presumed 'compensation bargain'" in which the employer assumes liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault, and compensation is relatively swift, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) The compensation bargain does not encompass conduct that contravenes a fundamental public policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902-903 (Miklosy); Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812.) Workers' compensation exclusivity is put at issue, and need not be alleged as an affirmative defense, if the complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating that the conditions of coverage are present and alleges no facts that would establish an exception to the exclusivity rule or negate the conditions of coverage. (Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 97.) As a general rule, injuries sustained by an employee while commuting to and from work are not compensable under the workers' compensation system. (Zenith Nat. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 944, 946-947.) This rule, known as the going and coming rule, bars workers' compensation for injuries that occur "during a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances." (Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157; see General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598.) The going and coming rule is a judicially created doctrine first recognized in California jurisprudence in Ocean Acc. etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1916) 173 Cal. 313 159 P. 1041 (Ocean Accident), where the California Supreme Court held that the death of a shipworker who fell into the water and drowned on the way to the vessel on which he worked was not covered by workers' compensation. The reason was that an employee going to or coming from his place of employment, such as the shipworker there, was not rendering a service to his or her employer at the time of the accident. (Id. at pp. 321-322; see Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 153-154 discussing Ocean Accident; Zenith Nat. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 946 Cal. has not adopted a statutory codification of the going and coming rule, but it has become a part of workers' compensation jurisprudence by judicial decision.) A leading commentator explains the rule as premised on the theory that an employee who travels to his or her place of employment has not yet entered the course of employment. (See Lewis v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 562, citing 2 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workers' Compensation (2d ed.) 9.033b.) The going and coming rule became the subject of significant criticism, the California Supreme Court, for example, describing it as a "'slippery concept,'" "'riddled with exceptions,'" and difficult to apply uniformly. (Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 352.) Such criticism led, among other things, to the premises line rule. In an effort to create a "sharp line of demarcation" as to when the employee's commute terminates and the course of employment commences, courts adopted the premises line rule, which provides that the employment relationship generally commences once the employee enters the employer's premises. (Lefebvre v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 750.) "The 'premises line' has the advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins--objectively and fairly. This outweighs the disadvantages incurred by attempting to formulate and apply a subjective rule justly." (General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 599.) Succinctly put, prior to entry on the employer's premises, "the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery; after entry, injury is generally presumed compensable as arising in the course of employment." (Id. at p. 598; see Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 329, 335-336 170 P.2d 18.)