In People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 480, the court held that when the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(2) minimum 15-year parole eligibility term applies, the determinate enhancement in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) cannot apply. Ortiz involved a murder that occurred on March 12, 1995. (57 Cal. App. 4th at p. 483.) In Ortiz, the then section 186.22, subdivision (b)(2) 15-year minimum parole eligibility date applied to the accused. (Stats. 1994, ch. 451, 1, pp. 2438-2439.) The Ortiz court noted in a decision filed before the June 2, 1998, adoption of Proposition 222, "Nothing in Penal Code section 186.22, former subdivision (b)(2) suggests this extended parole eligibility limitation period should be combined with an additional determinate term." (57 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 485-486.) In People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, the court held the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of street terrorism under section 186.22, subdivision (a) when, among other evidence, a gang expert testified as to his opinion that the defendant was an active gang member based on the expert's review of booking photos of the defendant showing the defendant's gang tattoos, an interview with the defendant in which the defendant admitted gang membership and gave a gang moniker. (People v. Martinez, supra, at p. 1331.) In People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, the defendant was convicted of committing gang-related first degree murder using a gun. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm-use enhancement, and an additional 10 years for a criminal-street-gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). (Lopez, at p. 1005.) The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a first degree murder committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang is subject to the 10-year enhancement in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) or whether such a murder falls within that subdivision's excepting clause and is governed instead by the 15-year minimum parole eligibility term in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) ( 186.22, subd. (b)(5)). (Id. at p. 1006.) The Lopez court examined the plain language of section 186.22 and concluded where a defendant commits a first degree murder, the 15-year minimum parole eligibility term applies, in lieu of the determinate 10-year term for the enhancement. (Lopez at p. 1009.) Acknowledging the application of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) would have "no practical effect for first degree murderers, who now have a minimum parole eligibility term of 25 years ( 190, subds. (a), (e)), or for second degree murderers, who now have a minimum parole eligibility term of 15 years (ibid.)," the Lopez court reasoned a true finding under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) could, nonetheless, be a factor to be weighed by the Board of Prison Terms in setting a defendant's release date from prison. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1009.) In sum, the Lopez court determined section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), rather than section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), governs gang-related murder sentences (with the possibility of parole), although application of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) is essentially unnecessary, amounting to no enhancement at all because section 190 fixes a parole date for murder sentences, which is either equal to or greater than the 15-year minimum parole eligibility term of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). The Supreme Court held that a defendant found to have committed first degree murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang was not subject to a 10-year enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). Instead, the 15-year minimum parole period under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) applied. (Lopez, at p. 1011.) The Lopez court acknowledged that, since first degree murder is punishable with a term of 25 years to life ( 190, subds.(a), (e)), applying section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) to impose a minimum parole term of 15 years "will have no practical effect for first degree murderers . . . ." (Lopez, at p. 1009.)