In People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, the California Supreme Court examined "how section 2900.5 should be applied when a defendant sentenced to a new criminal term seeks credit for presentence custody attributable to a parole revocation caused in part, but not exclusively, by the conduct that led to the new sentence." (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1182-1183.) The court concluded, "that such credit should be denied." (Id. at p. 1183.) The defendant in Bruner was arrested for three alleged parole violations, and upon arrest, "cocaine was found on his person." (Id. at p. 1181.) Penal Code 2900.5 states: (a) In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or similar residential institution, all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order, credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, and days served in home detention pursuant to Section 1203.016 or 1203.018, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence. If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied to the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be applied to the base fine. If an amount of the base fine is not satisfied by jail credits, or by community service, the penalties and assessments imposed on the base fine shall be reduced by the percentage of the base fine that was satisfied. (b) For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed. (c) For the purposes of this section, term of imprisonment includes any period of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation or otherwise ordered by a court in imposing or suspending the imposition of any sentence, and also includes any term of imprisonment, including any period of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole, prior to discharge, whether established or fixed by statute, by any court, or by any duly authorized administrative agency. (d) It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in Section 1213. (e) It is the duty of any agency to which a person is committed to apply the credit provided for in this section for the period between the date of sentencing and the date the person is delivered to the agency. (f) If a defendant serves time in a camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, juvenile detention facility, similar residential facility, or home detention program pursuant to Section 1203.016, 1203.017, or 1203.018, in lieu of imprisonment in a county jail, the time spent in these facilities or programs shall qualify as mandatory time in jail. (g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code as it pertains to the sentencing of convicted offenders, this section does not authorize the sentencing of convicted offenders to any of the facilities or programs mentioned herein. The defendant "was released on his own recognizance on the cocaine charge," but "remained in custody under a parole hold pending disposition of his parole status." (Ibid.) Ultimately, the defendant's parole was revoked "on the basis of the three earlier violations, plus his possession of cocaine at the time of his arrest." (Ibid.) The defendant received concurrent sentences for his parole revocation and the cocaine offense. (Id. at pp. 1181-1182.) He was credited for his postarrest, prerevocation custody on the parole revocation term, but not on the cocaine possession sentence. On appeal he sought custody credit against the cocaine possession term. The California Supreme Court held that "when presentence custody may be concurrently attributable to two or more unrelated acts, and where the defendant has already received credit for such custody in another proceeding, the strict causation rules of Joyner should apply." (Id. at p. 1180.) Under the strict causation test, "a prisoner is not entitled to credit for presentence confinement unless he shows that the conduct which led to his conviction was the sole reason for his loss of liberty during the presentence period." (Id. at p. 1191.) A defendant's "criminal sentence may not be credited with jail or prison time attributable to a parole or probation revocation that was based only in part upon the same criminal episode." (Ibid.)