On November 2, 2004, California voters approved Prop. 64. Prop. 64 became effective the following day, pursuant to article II, section 10(a) of the California Constitution. Prop. 64 amended certain provisions of the UCL and the false advertising law (See Bus. & Prof. Code, 17203, 17204, 17535, as amended by Prop. 64.) Prop. 64 amended Business and Professions Code section 17204 to require that actions filed by private persons pursuant to the UCL be brought only by plaintiffs who have suffered injury in fact: " Actions for any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted ... by any person O>acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public<O who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition." (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17204, as amended by Prop. 64.) Prop. 64 also amended Business and Professions Code section 17203 to state that a private party may bring a representative action only if that person has suffered injury in fact and has complied with the class action certification requirements set forth in section 382: "Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition. Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements *9 of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... ." (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17203, as amended by Prop. 64.) Similarly, Prop. 64 amended the false advertising law to state that a private plaintiff may bring a representative action under that statute only if that person has suffered injury in fact and has complied with class action certification requirements: " Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by ... any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of this chapter. Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of this section and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ..." (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17535, as amended by Prop. 64.) " Courts generally presume that a newly enacted statute does not have retrospective effect unless there has been some clearly expressed contrary intent. (See Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282.) However, although courts normally construe statutes to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively, courts also generally hold that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, 'a repeal of the statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.' (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles County (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1, 11-12; see also Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829-831; Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644, 652-653.) This is because a court must 'apply the law in force at the time of the decision' when a remedial statute is repealed prior to final judgment being entered in a case. (Brenton v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 690 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702.) " ' "The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time." ' (Mann, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 829; see also Govt. Code, 9606 'Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be impaired. Persons acting under any statute act in contemplation of this power of repeal'.) This is because 'a party's rights and remedies under a ... statute may be enforced after repeal only where such rights have vested before repeal' (County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149), and unlike a common law right, 'a statutory remedy does not vest until final judgment' (South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 612, 619). If the statutory right to recover has not vested through the entry of final judgment by the time of the repeal, the right remains inchoate, incomplete, or unperfected, and the repeal operates to extinguish the right at the time the repeal is enacted. (People v. One 1953 Buick 2-Door (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358, 365.)" (Bivens, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.) In Bivens v. Corel Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th. 1392, 1402-1403, the Court outlined the law applicable in determining whether Prop. 64 applies to pending cases: " Courts generally presume that a newly enacted statute does not have retrospective effect unless there has been some clearly expressed contrary intent. (See Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 279 Cal. Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434.) However, although courts normally construe statutes to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively, courts also generally hold that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, 'a repeal of the statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.' (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles County (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1, 11-12; see also Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829-831 (Mann); Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644, 652-653.) This is because a court must 'apply the law in force at the time of the decision' when a remedial statute is repealed prior to final judgment being entered in a case. (Brenton v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 690.) " ' "The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time." ' (Mann, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 829; see also Govt. Code, 9606 'Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be impaired. Persons acting under any statute act in contemplation of this power of repeal'.) This is because 'a party's rights and remedies under a ... statute may be enforced after repeal only where such *0 rights have vested before repeal' (County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57), and unlike a common law right, 'a statutory remedy does not vest until final judgment' (South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 612, 619). If the statutory right to recover has not vested through the entry of final judgment by the time of the repeal, the right remains inchoate, incomplete, or unperfected, and the repeal operates to extinguish the right at the time the repeal is enacted. (People v. One 1953 Buick 2-Door (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358, 365 (One 1953 Buick 2-Door).)" (Bivens, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.)