Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) provides: "Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($ 5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment." Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) provides: "Every person who buys or receives any motor vehicle, as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code, any trailer, as defined in Section 630 of the Vehicle Code, any special construction equipment, as defined in Section 565 of the Vehicle Code, or any vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor vehicle, trailer, special construction equipment, or vessel from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two or three years or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000), or both, or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($ 1,000), or both." In People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, the California Supreme Court addressed the question "whether a defendant who is convicted of a Vehicle Code section 10851(a) violation (unlawfully taking or driving another's vehicle) may also be convicted under Penal Code section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property when the evidence does not exclude the possibility that the defendant committed both theft and nontheft forms of the section 10851(a) offense by taking the vehicle with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession and later also engaging in posttheft driving." The Court concluded that "when, as in this case, the evidence is such that it is not reasonably probable that a properly instructed jury would have found that the defendant took the vehicle but did not engage in any posttheft driving, a reviewing court may construe the Vehicle Code section 10851(a) conviction as a conviction for posttheft driving and on this basis may uphold the conviction under Penal Code section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property." (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 872.) As the Garza court explained, "Section 10851(a) separately prohibits the acts of driving a vehicle and taking a vehicle. Thus, a defendant who steals a vehicle and then continues to drive it after the theft is complete commits separate and distinct violations of section 10851(a)." (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 880.) The distinction between unlawfully "taking" a vehicle and unlawfully "driving" a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) is relevant for purposes of the dual conviction doctrine: "A person who violates section 10851(a) by taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, and who is convicted of that offense on that basis, cannot also be convicted of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. If, on the other hand, a section 10851(a) conviction is based on posttheft driving, a separate conviction under section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property is not precluded. " (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876.) In People v. Garza (2005) the California Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether a person could be convicted of both offenses. The Court succinctly stated the applicable principles, the issue, and its conclusion: "Subdivision (a) of Vehicle Code section 10851 (hereafter section 10851(a)), defines the crime of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft, and the taking may be accomplished by driving the vehicle away. For this reason, a defendant convicted under section 10851(a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession has suffered a theft conviction and may not also be convicted under section 496(a) of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. On the other hand, unlawful driving of a vehicle is not a form of theft when the driving occurs or continues after the theft is complete (for convenience, we will refer to this as post-theft driving). Therefore, a conviction under section 10851(a) for post-theft driving is not a theft conviction and does not preclude a conviction under section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. The issue here is whether a conviction under section 10851(a) for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle bars a conviction under section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property when the evidence at trial adequately supported the section 10851(a) conviction on either a taking or a post-theft driving theory, the prosecutor argued both the taking and the post-theft driving theories to the jury, the trial court's instructions did not require the jury to choose between the theories and did not explain the rule prohibiting convictions for stealing and receiving the same stolen property, and the jury's guilty verdict did not disclose which theory or theories the jurors accepted. Consistent with prior Court of Appeal decisions, we conclude that when, as in this case, the evidence is such that it is not reasonably probable that a properly instructed jury would have found that the defendant took the vehicle but did not engage in any post-theft driving, a reviewing court may construe the Vehicle Code section 10851(a) conviction as a conviction for post-theft driving and on this basis may uphold the conviction under Penal Code section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. Because the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion, we will reverse its judgment." (People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 871-872.) In Garza, the defendant was found in a vehicle which had been stolen from his former employer. The arrest was made six days after the vehicle was missing, and the prosecution argued that there was sufficient evidence that defendant both took the vehicle and drove it. The verdict did not specify whether the jury found illegal taking, or driving, or both. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could not convict defendant both of theft and receiving the same stolen property. (People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 881.) The court then applied a harmless error test: "To determine whether this error caused prejudice to defendant amounting to a miscarriage of justice, we ask whether it is reasonably probable that a properly instructed jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant by not convicting him of violating both section 10851(a) and section 496(a). " (People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 881-882.)