California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 3051 Case Law

"Welfare and Institutions Code Section 3000 et seq. establishes a program for the nonpunitive treatment and control of narcotics addicts, including persons convicted of criminal offenses, implemented by periods of treatment within CRC and outpatient supervision." (People v. Cruz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 413, 419.) Section 3051 "vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether evaluation for commitment to CRC is appropriate." (People v. Masters (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 700, 703-704.) Section 3051 provides in relevant part: "Upon conviction of a defendant for a felony, . . . if it appears to the judge that the defendant may be addicted or by reason of repeated use of narcotics may be in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics the judge shall suspend the execution of the sentence and order the district attorney to file a petition for commitment of the defendant to the Director of Corrections for confinement in the narcotic detention, treatment, and rehabilitation facility unless, in the opinion of the judge, the defendant's record and probation report indicate such a pattern of criminality that he or she does not constitute a fit subject for commitment under this section." Thus, "exercise of discretion under section 3051 involves a two-step process: The court must determine if defendant is addicted or in danger of becoming addicted to narcotics; and, if so, the court must either suspend execution of sentence and order initiation of CRC commitment proceedings or find the defendant unsuitable for such commitment." (People v. Masters, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 704.) As to the second step of this process, "excessive criminality is the only consideration a sentencing court should look to for refusing to initiate CRC proceedings." (People v. Granado (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 194, 200.) This determination "necessarily involves an assessment, based upon the defendant's record and probation report, whether the defendant's main problem is drug abuse or a criminal orientation as reflected in a pattern or criminality." (People v. Cruz, supra, 217 Cal. App. 3d at p. 421.) In making that determination, the court considers the defendant's prior convictions, prior performance on probation and parole and the nature and seriousness of the current offenses. (Id. at p. 420.) The broad discretion given the court to evaluate such information " 'will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse.' " (Id. at p. 421.) The sentencing court must state the reasons for refusing to initiate CRC commitment proceedings. (People v. Granado, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 201-202.) At a minimum this requires that the court "not merely parrot the phrase finding 'excessive criminality.' " (People v. Masters, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.) However, courts have not spoken with one voice as to precisely what is required of a sentencing court in this regard. In Granado, this court stated: "We believe that at a minimum the required statement of reasons must include some specification of where the court was looking in making its finding of excessive criminality. In other words, was it looking at the defendant's prior convictions, his prior performance on probation or parole, the nature and seriousness of the current offense, or some other factors evidencing criminality?" (People v. Granado, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 202-203.) In People v. McGinnis (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 592, the court suggested that a sentencing court must specify "what it is about a defendant's pattern of criminal activity which renders him unfit for CRC." (Id. at p. 597.) And in Masters the court stated: "The important consideration for purposes of appellate review, however, is not whether the trial court uses magic words such as 'a pattern of criminality' or even whether the court itself recites on the record each and every fact in support of its sentencing choice. Rather, the important consideration is whether the record includes 'some specification of where the court was looking in making its finding of a pattern of criminality. . . .' To the extent that McGinnis requires a more exacting statement of reasons we respectfully disagree with it." (People v. Masters, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.)