California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 730.6

Welfare and Institutions Code Section 730.6 governs restitution in cases in which a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court under section 602. It is parallel to Penal Code section 1202.4 governing restitution generally. (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1386-1387 (Brittany L.); In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 (Anthony M.).) Section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that it "is the intent of the Legislature that a victim . . . who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor." Subdivision (h) provides in relevant part that "restitution . . . shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. . . . The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. . . . A restitution order . . . shall identify . . . the amount of each victim's loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim . . . for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct . . . including . . . .(1) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen . . . property. The value of stolen . . . property shall be the replacement cost of like property . . . ." A " 'victim' " includes "the immediate surviving family of the actual victim" and nothing prevents a court from ordering restitution to any "corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of an offense." ( 730.6, subd. (j)(1) & (k).) The Victims' Bill of Rights, enacted by the voters in 2008 as part of the State Constitution also provides that a crime " 'victim' is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act." (Cal. Const., art. 1, 28, subd. (e).) "Generally, an order of restitution will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. The court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law or fails to 'use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and it may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious' ." (Anthony M, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) Any rational method may be used, "provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and pro-vided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation." (Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1391-1392.) These purposes are "three-fold, to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating him or her for his or her economic losses." (Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) And " 'while the amount of restitution cannot be arbitrary or capricious, "there is no requirement the restitu-tion order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the minor is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action . . . ." ' " (Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391, ) Moreover, a victim's right to restitution is to be " 'broadly and liberally construed.' " (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132 (Johnny M.).) An appellate court generally reviews the court's findings imposing direct victim restitution for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) " ' "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found." ' " (Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132; accord, People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 reviewing court "will not disturb the trial court's determination of restitution unless it is arbitrary, capricious and exceeds the bounds of reason".) But where the relevant facts are undisputed and the reviewing court's primary concern is the interpretation of the controlling restitution statute, we review the claim de novo. (In re Eric S. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1560, 1564 (Eric S.).) Accordingly, "the standard of review therefore depends on the nature of the question presented" and where the issue is one of law, we will consider it without deference to the trial court's action. (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.) And " 'while the amount of restitution cannot be arbitrary or capricious, "there is no requirement the restitu-tion order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the minor is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that may be recoverable in a civil action . . . ." ' " (Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) Moreover, a victim's right to restitution is to be " 'broadly and liberally construed.' " (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132 (Johnny M.).) But a restitution order is not intended to provide a victim with a windfall and it must be limited to economic losses. (Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) An appellate court reviews the court's findings imposing direct victim restitution for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) " ' "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found." ' " (Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132; accord, People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 reviewing court "will not disturb the trial court's determination of restitution unless it is arbitrary, capricious and exceeds the bounds of reason".) "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a restitution award, the ' "power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the trial court's findings.' Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trial court's findings,' the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact." (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468-469.)