"Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 "'Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into play'".) "An interrogation is custodial when 'a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-dom of action in any significant way.' Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry is whether there was '"'a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'"' Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. When reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an ap-pellate court must 'apply a deferential substantial evidence standard' to the trial court's factual findings re-garding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, 'a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt free to end the ques-tioning and leave' ." (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400; see People v. Ochoa, supra, at p. 402 "'Once the scene is . . . reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "was there a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest"'".) In determining whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda, "the totality of the circumstanc-es surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole. Although no one factor is controlling, the follow-ing circumstances should be considered: '(1) Whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.'" (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403.) "Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could termi-nate the questioning, whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the suspect's freedom of movement during the interview, and whether po-lice officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were 'aggressive, confrontational, and/or accu-satory,' whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview." (Id. at pp. 1403-1404.) "Miranda warnings are required 'as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associat-ed with formal arrest."'" (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 440 104 S.Ct. 3138.) "The question whether defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact." (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) "We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court's factual findings, but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial." (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.) "In order to invoke the protections of Miranda, a suspect must be subjected to custodial interrogation, i.e., he must be 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.' 'The ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 197, citing California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 97 S.Ct. 711.) The determinative question is "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt he or she was in custody." (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) Thus, "Custody determinations are re-solved by an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest?" (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.) In making this determination, "'the totality of the circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is dispositive. However, the most important considerations include (1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investi-gation has focused on the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of questioning.'" (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1050.) "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime." (Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495.) "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by the Miranda decision. In such situations the compelling atmos-phere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477-478.) "'Under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) "In order to combat the pressures of custodial interrogation and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights" to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. "If the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from him during interrogation thereafter may not be admitted against him at his trial" , at least during the prosecution's case-in-chief .' 'Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights.' To establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. " (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374-375 (Nelson).) "A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police." (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 388-389.) "Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires 'an evaluation of the defendant's state of mind' and 'inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' ." (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375.) "Ultimately, the question becomes whether the Miranda waiver is shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. The waiver must be 'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception' , and knowing in the sense that it was 'made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 219.)