In Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, the trial court denied the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. (Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.) The plaintiff filed a request for attorney fees after the defendant had unsuccessfully appealed the denial and the matter was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings. (Ibid.) The trial court and the reviewing court held that the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, which was filed after entry of the prejudgment appealable order denying the section 425.16 motion but before entry of judgment concluding the action, was not untimely under rule 3.1702. (Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 459-460, 468.) The Carpenter court interpreted "rule 3.1702 such that the time limits imposed by the rule do not commence to run in connection with a motion for fees under section 425.16 until entry of judgment." (Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, fn. 9.) In Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) the trial court denied the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, leaving the litigation to proceed through an appeal of the order. Furthermore, in Carpenter there was no notice of entry of the order, but only a notice of ruling, which did not trigger the 60-day period. (Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 463, fn. 8.) The Carpenter court nonetheless regarded rule 3.1702 as ambiguous in referring to "'fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court.'" (Carpenter, supra, at p. 464.) In its interpretation of that language, the rule "applies only to a motion to recover all prejudgment attorney fees incurred in an action, and contemplates the filing of such a motion at the conclusion of the lawsuit." (Ibid.) The rule did not, in the Carpenter court's view, apply to a motion for fees for services leading to the anti-SLAPP order because that is a "'claim for services' rendered before 'the rendition of judgment.' It is not a claim 'for services up to and including the rendition of judgment,' and therefore does not fit within the plain language of rule 3.1702." (Ibid.) The appellate court thus concluded that the time limits prescribed in rule 3.1702 do not begin to run until entry of a final judgment in the litigation, "not entry of a prejudgment appealable order." (Carpenter, supra, at p. 468.)