In Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees altogether in a FEHA case where the fee request was unreasonably inflated. After a five-day jury trial, the jury rejected Chavez's claims under FEHA for employment discrimination and harassment based on race and perceived mental disability, but found in his favor on a retaliation claim and awarded him damages of $ 11,500. Chavez "sought attorney fees for a total of 1,851.43 attorney hours between January 12, 2000, and October 24, 2005, during which Chavez's attorney brought and litigated on Chavez's behalf two actions in Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . and one action in federal district court . . . , which also included time spent on an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. . . . Chavez does not claim that his success on the single FEHA retaliation claim had any broad public impact or resulted in significant benefit to anyone other than himself. Because this single successful claim apparently was not closely related to or factually intertwined with his many unsuccessful claims, the trial court reasonably could and presumably did conclude that Chavez was not entitled to attorney fees for time spent litigating those unsuccessful claims. Whether Chavez was entitled to an award of attorney fees for time spent litigating the single successful claim requires consideration of another established principle governing attorney fee awards: 'A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.' Here, the trial court reasonably could and presumably did conclude that Chavez's attorney fee request in the amount of $ 870,935.50 for 1,851.43 attorney hours was grossly inflated when considered in light of the single claim on which Chavez succeeded, the amount of damages awarded on that claim, and the amount of time an attorney might reasonably expect to spend in litigating such a claim. This fact alone was sufficient, in the trial court's discretion, to justify denying attorney fees altogether." (Chavez, at pp. 990-991.)