Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, a Fourth Appellate District opinion issued in December 2001, was a case of first impression. ( Id. at p. 1088 no other "published California decision has specifically considered the question whether a malicious prosecution claim can be subject to the anti-SLAPP statute . . . .".) The anti-SLAPP procedures of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) apply to "causes of action 'arising from' an 'act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition . . . under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.' ( 425.16, subd. (b)(1), )" ( Id. at p. 1087.) Filing a judicial complaint is, under established constitutional principles, an exercise of a party's constitutional right of petition. (Ibid.) Filing a judicial complaint also "satisfies the 'in connection with a public issue' component of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) because it pertains to an official proceeding. " (Ibid.) In Chavez, the malicious prosecution plaintiff claimed he was the victim of an underlying action filed by the defendant with a malicious motive and without probable cause. The malicious prosecution claim, Chavez held, "'arises from' the defendant's constitutionally protected petitioning activity, and therefore is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. ( 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)" ( Chavez v. Mendoza, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) The Chavez court relied upon other recent appellate decisions that have held section 425.16 is "applicable to causes of action that are functionally indistinguishable from malicious prosecution claims. (See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005-1010, 1015 . . . holding plaintiff's abuse of process claim based on defendants' filing of an SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) complaint was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute; Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. 2001 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 151 holding claim arising from the allegedly improper filing and prosecution of prior action arose 'from litigation activity' and therefore 'may appropriately be the subject of a section 425.16 motion'; see also Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim 1996 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 647-649 holding that a complaint seeking to overturn a prior judgment based on alleged bias of trial judge was subject to anti-SLAPP statute.)" (Ibid.) Chavez also noted that other jurisdictions have held that malicious prosecution actions are subject to anti-SLAPP statutes. (Id. at p. 1088, fn. 2 citing McLarnon v. Jokisch (2000) 431 Mass. 343, 347, 727 N.E.2d 813; Stetson, Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York's Anti-SLAPP Statute (1995) 70 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1324, 1329.) The Chavez court rejected the argument that applying the anti-SLAPP statute to malicious prosecution complaints would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute's purpose of deterring frivolous lawsuits. ( Chavez v. Mendoza, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) "This argument is unavailing because a court is required to interpret a statute as written and not to construe the statute to reach a result that it thinks the Legislature was intending to accomplish. Moreover, although the Chavezes' argument has intuitive appeal, it ultimately fails because the Chavezes are confusing the threshold question concerning the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute with the question whether a malicious prosecution plaintiff can establish a probability of success on the merits. The purpose of section 425.16 is not to prevent lawsuits that arise from the exercise of constitutional rights, but it is to deter frivolous and improperly motivated lawsuits arising from those rights. Section 425.16 provides a 'fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal' of frivolous claims that are subject to the statute. Thus, a determination that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to a malicious prosecution claim will not prevent valid malicious prosecution claims, but will require a plaintiff bringing this claim to demonstrate early on that the complaint is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment. This result is consistent with the disfavored nature of the malicious prosecution tort, and the view that such claims are too frequently used as a dilatory and harassing device, and that the remedy for frivolous 'litigation does not lie in an expansion of malicious prosecution liability. ' ( Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873, 254 Cal. Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498 . . . .)" ( Chavez v. Mendoza, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1088-1089.)