In Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 792, the foreman of an auction yard gave his set of keys to two employees, Vern Smith and Toni JoAnn Abbott, as he left work so Smith and Abbott could "be in charge of the yard the next day." (Id. at p. 799.) The foreman told the two employees to " 'Go have a beer.' " The employees understood this statement to mean they could obtain the beer from the foreman's office. It was a "regular practice" for the foreman "to furnish alcoholic beverages on the premises to customers of the auction yard" and most of the yard's employees "had consumed alcoholic beverages" in the foreman's office; Abbott drank alcoholic beverages at the auction yard at least 10 times with the knowledge, permission, and participation of management. (Ibid.) Smith, Abbott, and another employee went to the foreman's office, obtained six packs of beer, and began drinking. Later, a customer joined them and they drank hard liquor. (Id. at p. 799.) Several hours later, Smith and Abbott left the auction yard in Abbott's truck to feed Abbott's horses. Abbott drove off of the road, killing herself and injuring Smith. The trial court granted the auction yard's motion for summary judgment. (Id. at p. 798.) On appeal, the Childers court considered the doctrine of respondeat superior liability. The court noted that "several California cases have allowed nonemployee third parties to recover from employers for the tortious conduct of employees, where the tortious conduct was a foreseeable risk of the employee's consumption of alcohol occurring after ordinary working hours but within the scope of employment." (Childers, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 803.) The court then determined that an employee's activities occur within the course and scope of employment when the activities: (1) are undertaken with the employer's permission; (2) benefit the employer; (3) are a customary incident of employment. (Id. at p. 804.) The court also noted, however, that "so long as the risk is created within the scope of the employee's employment, the scope of employment must follow the risk so long as it acts proximately to cause injury." (Id. at p. 805.) The Childers court determined that Abbott consumed alcohol within the scope of her employment because the activity: (1) "was undertaken with the auction yard's permission;" (2) benefitted the auction yard; (3) was a customary incident of Abbott's employment. (Childers, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 805-806.) The court also determined that "Abbott's subsequent negligent driving was a clearly foreseeable risk of her consumption of alcohol and, therefore, of the auction yard's business enterprise." (Id. at p. 806.)