In Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, the employer (a trucking company) used a computerized system to keep track of various aspects of its drivers' activities. (Id. at p. 962.) However, it did not schedule meal periods or monitor compliance in this regard. (Ibid.) he employer acknowledged drivers were entitled to take a 30-minute meal break on their own time after working five hours, but the decision was left to the employees' discretion. (Ibid.) The Cicairos court held "the [employer's] obligation to provide the [employees] with an adequate meal period is not satisfied by assuming that the meal periods were taken, because employers have 'an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty.' (Dept. of Industrial Relations, DLSE, Opinion Letter No. 2002.01.28 (Jan. 28, 2002) p. 1.)" (Id. at pp. 962-963.) The Court addressed a contention raised by an employer regarding the interpretation of IWC wage order No. 9-2001, which is codified in section 11090 of title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. (Cicairos, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.) The employer contended that section 3 of wage order No. 9-2001 exempted a class of workers from the entire wage order because it stated: " 'The provisions of this section are not applicable to employees subject to specified working conditions.' " (Cicairos, at p. 958.) The crux of the employer's argument was that the phrase "this section" referred to the section of the California Code of Regulations containing the wage order, rather than to section 3 of the wage order. (133 Cal.App.4th at p. 958.) In rejecting this contention, the appellate court remarked, "when the wage order No. 9 refers to itself in its entirety, the phrase 'this order' or 'this wage order' is used." (Cicairos, at p. 958.) The evidence showed the employer managed and scheduled drivers in such a way that prevented the drivers from taking their meal periods. (Id. at p. 962.) Thus, the employer had " 'an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty ,' " so that it was possible for the drivers to have a meal. (Ibid.) The Cicairos court did not find that the employer had to ensure employees actually took the meal period. In reversing a summary judgment granted to the employer with regard to meal break claims, the appellate court relied upon a January 28, 2002 opinion letter from the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE). Cicairos stated, "Under the facts presented ... the employer's obligation to provide the plaintiffs with an adequate meal period is not satisfied by assuming that the meal periods were taken, because employers have 'an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty.' (Dept. of Industrial Relations, DLSE, Opinion Letter No. 2002.01.28 (Jan. 28, 2002) p. 1.)" (Cicairos, supra, at pp. 962-963.) With regard to rest breaks, Cicairos held "the employer could ... be liable if the plaintiffs did not take their full 10-minute rest breaks because, as a practical matter, the defendant did not permit the plaintiffs to take their rest breaks. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 11090, subd. 12(A) employer must authorize and permit rest period.) ... The defendant has not proven it supplied the plaintiffs with their rest periods; therefore, summary judgment was improper." (Cicairos, supra, at p. 963.) In short, the court held that the employer of truck drivers had violated Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a) and an IWC wage order relating to meal periods. The employer claimed that "meal periods and rest breaks were the sole responsibility of the drivers because the company could not regulate the drivers' activities on the road." (Cicairos, supra, at p. 963.) However, one truck driver stated that "'there was no lunch schedule.'" (Ibid.) The evidence showed that the employer managed and scheduled the drivers in such a manner that drivers were unable to take their meal periods. Thus, the court concluded that the employer had violated the law and the employer had "'an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty,'" so that it was possible for the drivers to have a meal. (Id. at p. 962.)