In City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, the Court held that section 425.16 did not apply to the city's action. The court noted, among other things, that the fact that the city's action was filed shortly after the owners' filed their federal suit was insufficient to trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute because the "mere fact an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose from that activity." (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th. at pp. 76-77.) Furthermore, allegations that the city's action was filed "in response to" or was "triggered by" the filing of the federal action were also insufficient because the city's subjective motivations were irrelevant. (Id. at p. 78.) The pertinent question was whether the city's cause of action arose out of the owners' protected speech or petition. The court found that it did not because the evidence showed that the city's action and the owner's federal action arose out of the same underlying controversy regarding the validity of the rent control ordinance. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected as fallacious the notion that "since the two lawsuits reference the same underlying controversy, the second arose out of the first." (Id. at p. 80, fn. 5.) The California Supreme Court interpreted the requirement in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) that a defendant demonstrate that the plaintiff's action is one "arising from" protected activity. In Cotati, a group of mobile home park owners sued a municipality in federal court claiming that the municipality's rent stabilization ordinance was unconstitutional. (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 72.) The municipality subsequently filed a declaratory relief action in state court seeking a declaration that the ordinance was constitutional. (Ibid.) The owners filed an anti-SLAPP motion in the state court action (ibid.), arguing that the municipality's state action was within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose from the owners' action in filing the federal lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 72-73.) The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that that the municipality had filed its action shortly after the owners filed the federal action, named only the owners as defendants, and involved " 'the exact contention' " made by the owners in the federal action. (Id. at p. 73.) The Cotati court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the state court action had "arisen from" protected activity. (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 76.) The court began by emphasizing that the timing of the City's filing did not demonstrate that the action arose from the owners' filing of the federal action. (Id. at pp. 76-77.) The court stated, "It is indisputably true, as the trial court observed, that City's action was filed shortly after Owners filed their claim in federal court. But the mere fact an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose from that activity." (Ibid.) The Cotati court further explained that to interpret " 'arising from' in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as meaning 'in response to,' as Owners have urged, would in effect render all cross-actions potential SLAPP's. . . ." (Id. at p. 77.) The court rejected this interpretation as both leading to an "absurd result" and being inconsistent with the statutory scheme governing cross-complaints. (Ibid.) The Cotati court further held that the "City's subjective intent in filing the action is not relevant under the anti-SLAPP statute." (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78.) "A claim filed in response to, or in retaliation for, threatened or actual litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute simply because it may be viewed as an oppressive litigation tactic." (Ibid.) A trial court may not focus on a plaintiffs' "litigation tactics," but rather, must determine, based "on the substance of plaintiff's lawsuit," whether the defendant has demonstrated that "an alleged SLAPP arises from protected speech or petitioning." (Id. at p. 78.) The Supreme Court summarized its holding by stating, "The statutory phrase 'cause of action . . . arising from' means simply that the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech." (Ibid.) In applying this holding, the Supreme Court concluded that the municipality's action arose from the underlying dispute between the municipality and the owners that was at issue in both the federal and state actions, rather than from the owners' exercise of their constitutional right to file the federal action. (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 80; see also id. at p. 77.) The court observed, "While City's complaint repeatedly refers to the underlying subject matter of Owners' federal action (i.e., the mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance and arguments respecting its validity), it contains no reference to the action itself." (Id. at p. 77.) Thus, the municipality's action was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, since it was not an action "arising from" protected activity. (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 80.) In City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 72, a city sued mobile home park owners for declaratory relief concerning a contested rent control ordinance. The trial court dismissed the state court action as a SLAPP because it was in response to the owners' pending federal action challenging the ordinance, and was filed to gain a more favorable forum to litigate the constitutionality of the ordinance. (Id. at pp. 72-73.) The California Supreme Court reinstated the city's declaratory relief cause of action because the action did not arise from the owners' federal suit but from a preexisting controversy over the ordinance. (Id. at pp. 79-80.) The court observed that the proper question in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion is "what activity or facts underlie" the cause of action. (Id. at p. 79.) The basis for declaratory relief is the existence of an actual, present controversy. (Ibid.) While the owners' federal suit informed the city of the existence of the controversy, the federal suit did not constitute the controversy. (Ibid.)