City of Moorpark v. Superior Court of Ventura County

In City of Moorpark v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 959 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1998), plaintiff was an administrative secretary employed by the city who suffered a work-related knee injury. Her supervisor terminated her employment because her injury prevented her from performing essential job functions. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the city claiming discrimination based on a physical disability in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The city defended asserting that plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law. The trial court disagreed and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. At issue in Moorpark was whether California Labor Code section 132a provided the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, precluding FEHA or common law wrongful discharge claims. Section 132a prohibited employers from discriminating against employees "who are injured in the course and scope of their employment." City of Moorpark, 959 P.2d at 756. The Moorpark court found that the existence of a workers' compensation remedy does not, by itself, establish the exclusivity of that remedy, and emphasized that section 132a does not contain an exclusive remedy clause. Id. at 1154. The court also determined that the general exclusivity provisions of the state's workers' compensation code, sections 3600, subdivision (a) and 3602, subdivision (a) did not establish that section 132a is an exclusive remedy for work-related injury discrimination. The court reasoned that "the plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions contained in subdivisions (a) of sections 3600 and 3602 "apparently limits those provisions to division 4 remedies. Remedies that the Legislature placed in other divisions of the Labor Code are simply not subject to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions." Id. at 759. Moorpark also found that terminations in violation of section 132a fall outside of the compensation bargain because such conduct is "'obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality.'" Id.