In Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, (2017) 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, the Court of Appeal confirmed "that the use of excessive force can be enough to satisfy the Bane Acts threat, intimidation or coercion element." (17 Cal. App. 5th at 799.) The Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the argument that appellants advance here, explaining that the text of the Bane Act does not require "that the offending threat, intimidation or coercion be independent from the constitutional violation alleged." (Id. at 800.) Rather, the court explained, in the context of an unlawful arrest, "the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestees right to freedom from unreasonable seizure." (Id. at 801-02.) The Court of Appeal noted, federal district courts in California examining the line of cases stretching from Shoyoyecontinued to reach different conclusions with respect to whether Bane Act claims require that the coercion alleged be separate from the constitutional violation, including in the context of deliberate indifference claims. The Cornell court went on to reason that because the Bane Act was crafted to cover actions by law enforcement officials through its inclusion of the phrase "whether or not acting under color of law," and because much of what law enforcement officials do is "inherently coercive," reading the statute to exempt law enforcement activity would create a broad category of judicially created immunity that has no support in the text of the law. (Id.) The court held that: "properly read, the statutory phrase "threat, intimidation or coercion" serves as an aggravator justifying the conclusion that the underlying violation of rights is sufficiently egregious to warrant enhanced statutory remedies, beyond tort relief. We see no reason that, in addition, the required "threat, intimidation or coercion," whatever form it may take, must also be transactionally "independent" from a properly pleaded-and proved-unlawful arrest. (Id.) The court concluded that where "an unlawful arrest is properly pleaded and proved, the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention." (Id. at 801-02.) This standard, borrowed from federal civil rights law under 18 U.S.C. 241, "accomplishes in substance the same thing as the independent from inherent coercion test since it ensures ordinary negligence is not cognizable under Section 52.1." (Id. at 802.) Cornell explained that the test: " essentially sets forth two requirements for a finding of "specific intent" .... The first is a purely legal determination. Is the ... right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case? If the trial judge concludes that it is, then the jury must make the second, factual, determination. Did the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that ... right? If both requirements are met, even if the defendant did not in fact recognize the unlawfulness of his act, he will be adjudged as a matter of law to have acted with the requisite specific intent-i.e., "in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions or guarantees." " (Id. at 803.)