In County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to vacate an almost 10-year-old default judgment against him in a paternity and child support action. The defendant had submitted uncontested evidence demonstrating that the proof of service stating that he had been personally served was fraudulent because he was in fact incarcerated at the time he was said to have been served. The trial court acknowledged the false proof of service but held that the motion was untimely. On appeal, the court observed that the false proof of service, "in the absence of evidence showing any mistake or excuse in doing so, constitutes evidence of an intentional false act that was used to obtain fundamental jurisdiction over the defendant." (Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1231-1232.) It then disagreed with the trial court's analysis because "fundamental jurisdiction was obtained through an intentional fraud on the court." (Id. at p. 1233.) The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to vacate the almost 10-year-old default judgment against him in a paternity and child support action due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The uncontested extrinsic evidence defendant submitted demonstrated the original proof of service filed under penalty of perjury in the action stating that defendant had been personally served with the summons and complaint was fraudulent because he was in fact "incarcerated at the time he was said to have been served . . . ." Despite finding defendant had never been served, the trial court declined to vacate the default judgment because defendant's motion was not timely. The appellate court found the case was one "of exceptional circumstances where equitable relief is warranted." (Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.) "Because defendant was never served with the complaint and summons, or other documents and notices as required . . . the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him , and the resulting default judgment was, and is, therefore void, not merely voidable, as violating fundamental due process." (Ibid.) The Court held that "In any action 'to enforce a duty of support or some other personal obligation growing out of the parent-child relationship, personal jurisdiction over a defendant is essential.' " (Id. at p. 1227.) "Courts generally refer to jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in any action as 'fundamental jurisdiction,' and where this is lacking there is an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case. Under such circumstances, 'an ensuing judgment is void, and "thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time."' " (Id. at p. 1225.) Whether the judgment is void on its face, or can only be shown to be void by resort to extrinsic evidence, a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is still a void judgment. (Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 "once proof is made that the judgment is void based on extrinsic evidence, the judgment is said to be equally ineffective and unenforceable as if the judgment were void on its face because it violates constitutional due process".) However, when the judgment is not void on its face, a collateral attack is precluded. In that case, "the judgment or order may be attacked either in an independent equitable action without time limits , or by motion in the action in which the judgment or order was entered, usually made under a statute providing for such relief within certain time limits or a reasonable time." (Id. at p. 1228.) And "where relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or order was void for lack of due process or resulted from extrinsic fraud or mistake ." (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal said, "When a judgment or order is obtained based on a false return of service, the court has the inherent power to set it aside , and a motion brought to do so may be made on such ground even though the statutory period has run." (Id. at p. 1229.) But it also said, "Because of the strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments, equitable relief from a default judgment or order is available only in exceptional circumstances." (Id. at pp. 1229-1230.) In Gorham, the exceptional circumstances involved a process server who committed "perjury" in his declaration of service. He falsely claimed he served Gorham at one address at a time when "Gorham was in custody in jail." (Id. at p. 1231.) The court said this "constitutes evidence of an intentional false act that was used to obtain fundamental jurisdiction over Gorham." (Id. at p. 1232, italics added.) The reviewing court found a default judgment in a paternity and support case void for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, the court similarly refused to apply Family Code section 3691: "Although the trial court correctly declared the default judgment void, it declined to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint and summons although they have never been served on Gorham because it construed the law as requiring his motion to be brought within certain statutory times, particularly the time limits in Family Code section 3691, or made within a reasonable time to confer it with jurisdiction to act on his motion. However, as already mentioned above, because Gorham established through extrinsic evidence that the default judgment was void for want of personal jurisdiction over him, it had the same effect as if it had been void on its face and the court had the inherent power to set it aside even though any statutory periods had run." (Gorham, supra, at p. 1231.) As respondent aptly notes, "a California Family Code section cannot breathe life into a void judgment." "Where it is shown that there has been a complete failure of service of process upon a defendant, he generally has no duty to take affirmative action to preserve his right to challenge the judgment or order even if he later obtains actual knowledge of it because 'what is initially void is ever void and life may not be breathed into it by lapse of time.' Consequently under such circumstances, 'neither laches nor the ordinary statutes of limitation may be invoked as a defense' against an action or proceeding to vacate such a judgment or order." (Id. at p. 1229.) "Because respondent was never served with the complaint and summons, . . . the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him , and the resulting default judgment was, and is, therefore void, not merely voidable, as violating fundamental due process." (Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.)