In Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant in an MRPL proceeding does not have an absolute right, as does a defendant in a criminal action, not to be called as a witness and not to testify. ( Cramer, supra, at p. 137.) The court reasoned that commitment under the MRPL "must be deemed essentially civil in nature." It noted that the commitment is of limited duration, may be initiated by any interested party, is solely intended to provide for the care and treatment of persons subject to the MRPL, and "may not reasonably be deemed punishment either in its design or purpose. It is not analogous to criminal proceedings." ( Cramer, supra, at p. 137.) Cramer did not address the right of an MRPL defendant to a jury trial. However, virtually all of the courts which have considered that right in the context of other civil commitment statutes have concluded that civil and not criminal waiver principles should apply. Indeed, those principles have been held to apply in proceedings under the LPS Act. The Court held that, in proceedings for the commitment of a mentally retarded person, the person who was the subject of the proceedings could be called as a witness but that his privilege against self-incrimination must be respected -- as it must be respected in any proceeding, civil or criminal. Nevertheless, it distinguished these civil proceedings from criminal proceedings in allowing the person who was the subject of the proceeding, the "defendant" as it were, to be called as a witness.