In People v. Griffin (1991), the defense attorney announced that he and the prosecutor had agreed to continue the matter for trial assignment to November 2 with the trial date actually set for November 5, which was outside of the statutory 60-day limit. The trial court then inquired about "some days beyond" and asked if defendant would be willing to also "waive 15 days beyond that date?" the defendant in Griffin replied he would do so. (People v. Griffin, supra, 235 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1743.) On November 21, the defendant in Griffin moved for dismissal since the 15-day trailing period he had agreed to had passed and he had not been brought to trial. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The people appealed from the pretrial order of dismissal and argued that they had an additional 10 days to bring the defendant to trial that did not even commence to run until the end of the nonstatutory 15-day trailing period that the defendant had consented to. ( Id. at pp. 1743-1745.) The Griffin court stated that the statutory 10-day grace period is "automatic" and cannot be "rescinded" by a defendant, and held that the 10-day period went into effect at the conclusion of the nonstatutory 15-day trailing period that the defendant had agreed to. ( Id. at p. 1747.) We read Griffin in light of the actual procedural situation presented in that case. In Griffin, the defendant went beyond the statutory 10-day trailing period contained in Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B) and agreed to a nonstatutory trailing period in which he could be brought to trial. In such a situation, the court in Griffin simply held that the 10-day grace period of Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B) does not commence to run until the end of the nonstatutory trailing period. The holding in Griffin is limited to a situation where a defendant unilaterally agrees to a nonstatutory trailing period, and it does not apply to or impact on the situation found in the instant case which involves a statutory trailing period.