In Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, the Court explained that "although a trial court has discretion to vacate the entry of a default or subsequent judgment, this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that there is a proper ground for relief, and that the party has raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits." (See also generally Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008) P 5:276 et seq., p. 5-67 et seq. (rev. # 1, 2008) describing various grounds, procedures and time limits applicable to seeking relief from default.) "The proper procedure and time limits vary, depending on the asserted ground for relief." (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.) In Cruz, the Court explained that "extrinsic mistake exists when the ground for relief is not so much the fraud or other misconduct of one of the parties as it is the excusable neglect of the defaulting party to appear and present his claim or defense." (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 503.) The Court further explained that "relief on the ground of extrinsic fraud or mistake is not available to a party if that party has been given notice of an action yet fails to appear, without having been prevented from participating in the action." (Ibid.) To set aside a default judgment based upon extrinsic fraud or mistake, a party must satisfy three elements: (1) "the defaulted party must demonstrate it has a meritorious case;"; (2) "the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action;"; (3) "the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once . . . discovered." (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 503.)