In Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, the plaintiff was burned while undergoing chiropractic treatment on December 6, 1996. On December 1, 1997, the plaintiff's attorney sent a notification to the defendant doctor under section 364. (Id. at p. 383.) On December 2, 1997, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for products liability and medical malpractice, naming only Doe defendants. (Ibid.) An amendment to the complaint was filed February 24, 1998, naming the defendant as Doe 101. (Ibid.) The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the case was barred by the statute of limitations: "Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 474, the defendant argued that the February 24, 1998, amendment to the complaint was untimely because when the December 2, 1997, complaint was filed, the plaintiff knew of the existence of the defendant as a defendant." (Id. at p. 383.) The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant was timely brought into the case through the Doe amendment, despite the fact the plaintiff unquestionably knew of the defendant's identity when the complaint was filed. The defendant "was added to the lawsuit as a defendant prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations since the amendment to the complaint was filed within 90 days of the December 1, 1997, section 364 notice." (Davis v. Marin, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) "As the plaintiff notes, she could have filed an amended complaint naming the defendant as a defendant, rather than an amendment to the complaint. Had this been done, the trial court would not have inquired as to whether or not the defendant's identity was known to the plaintiff. Such an inquiry, and the analysis used under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, would have been irrelevant. There is no reason to treat the plaintiff's amendment to the complaint any differently than we would have treated an amended complaint naming the defendant as a defendant. To do so would elevate form over substance and would ignore common sense." (Ibid.) In Davis v. Marin (2000) two problems were presented: Was the defendant (a treating medical professional, Dr. Marin), timely sued either as a Doe defendant under section 474, or pursuant to a 90-day tolling period effected by a section 364 notice? The plaintiff in that case knew of the defendant doctor's identity as of the filing date of her complaint, and had already served her with such a notice. However, the complaint named only Doe defendants, and the plaintiff did not add Dr. Marin to the lawsuit as a named defendant until she filed a Doe amendment (within 90 days of the 364 notice). In Davis, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 380, the defendant, Dr. Marin, obtained a grant of summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting the defendant's argument that since she was brought in as a Doe defendant under section 474, the terms of section 364, subdivisions (d) and (e) could not apply to her as a Doe defendant. Rather, the court found the 90-day tolling period of section 364, subdivision (d) still applied because the defendant doctor had been personally given such a notice, and the court essentially deemed it immaterial that she was later brought into the lawsuit as a Doe defendant, because she was otherwise timely brought in within that 90-day tolling period. Under those circumstances, the question of whether or not the Doe amendment "related back" to the date the complaint was filed was irrelevant. (Davis, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) The Court of Appeal rejected any alternative approach that would "elevate form over substance and would ignore common sense." (Ibid.)