Dickens v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co

In Dickens v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 705, the Court considered whether a malicious prosecution claim predicated on an underlying criminal prosecution was subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. In that case, the plaintiff-insured sued his disability insurer after he was acquitted of insurance fraud charges. (Id. at p. 707.) He alleged the insurer had conducted a biased investigation and submitted its results to federal prosecutors in an effort to persuade them to commence criminal proceedings against him. (Id. at p. 709.) The court noted the holding in Jarrow Formulas. And, citing its own earlier decision in Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777 in which it held that a malicious prosecution action arising out of attorneys' presuit demand letters threatening the filing of complaints with the state Attorney General was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute -- the Dickens court held that, "by a parity of reasoning, whatever contact the insurer had with the federal authorities was likewise within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. It was contact with the executive branch of government and its investigators about a potential violation of law. The contact was preparatory to commencing an official proceeding authorized by law: a criminal prosecution for mail fraud. And to the extent Dickens's claim is based on testimony or evidence offered at his trial, that was clearly part of an official proceeding authorized by law." (Dickens, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.) Dickens also relied on Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, which held that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b)) absolutely shields those who report suspected criminal activity to the authorities. (Id. at p. 364.) The Dickens court concluded, "a malicious prosecution action predicated upon a defendant's alleged participation in procuring a criminal prosecution against a plaintiff falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. This conclusion furthers the statute's salutary purpose of acting as 'a procedural device for screening out meritless claims' which arise out of constitutionally protected conduct connected to a public issue." (Dickens, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 716)