In Dyer v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1376, the employee (who was employed by the State of California) challenged the refusal of the WCAB to instate her as a permanent, rather than a probationary employee when it found a violation of section 132a. (22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.) In examining the WCAB's power on this subject, we noted, "Labor Code section 132a provides that in the event an employer discriminates against an employee due to injury the employee is entitled to reinstatement, but does not otherwise define 'reinstatement.' However, reinstatement is a common remedy in cases of employment discrimination. (See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 626(b) age discrimination; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) discriminatory employment practices.) In such cases courts are vested with broad equitable discretion in fashioning and applying an appropriate remedy. In general, the WCAB has broad equitable powers with respect to matters within its jurisdiction. That the Legislature intended the WCAB to exercise its equitable powers with respect to matters of reinstatement is made clear in Labor Code section 132a, which provides that proceedings for reinstatement are to be instituted before the WCAB and 'the appeals board is vested with full power, authority, and jurisdiction to try and determine finally all matters specified in this section subject only to judicial review, except that the appeals board shall have no jurisdiction to try and determine a misdemeanor charge. . . .' (Lab. Code, 132a, subd. (4).)" (Id. at p. 1382.) The Court further explained, "In employment discrimination cases, 'reinstatement' may be used to refer to a return of an employee to a former position with the same rights and responsibilities while 'instatement' may be used to refer to remedial placement of the employee in a different or advanced position. In view of the broad equitable power vested in the courts, in an appropriate case the power to order 'reinstatement' includes the discretion to order 'instatement.' But in such cases 'instatement' is a matter of discretion and is not a matter of right. " (Ibid.) The Court concluded, "the general judicial reluctance to interfere with management decisions by ordering instatement rather than reinstatement has particular significance under the particular circumstances of this case. Our state Constitution provides that, except as exempted by the Constitution, every officer and employee of the state is within the civil service and 'in the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based upon merit ascertained by competitive examination.' (Cal. Const., art. VII, 1, subd. (b).) The Constitution creates the State Personnel Board and vests it with jurisdiction over the merit aspects of civil service including the enforcement of civil service statutes, the prescription of probationary periods and classifications, and the review of disciplinary actions. (Cal. Const., art. VII, 2, 3; Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 193.) Included in the State Personnel Board's authority is the power to review a decision of an appointing power to reject a probationer and to take appropriate action up to and including restoration of employment with an award of backpay. (Gov. Code, 19175-19180.) In this case it is unnecessary to consider, and we do not hold, that the constitutional jurisdiction of the State Personnel Board and a state employee's remedy before that board would preclude the WCAB from ordering instatement of a probationer in permanent status. We hold only that these factors strongly support the exercise of restraint by the WCAB in making reinstatement determinations. In short, where, as here, a probationary state employee is rejected on probation for numerous reasons and the WCAB finds injury- related discrimination relating to some but not all of those reasons and orders the employee reinstated as a probationary rather than permanent employee, only the most manifest abuse of discretion could warrant judicial interference in that decision." (Dyer, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383-1384.) Thus, Dyer holds the WCAB has the discretion to order reinstatement for a worker who is successful in proving a section 132a violation despite concurrent proceedings before the SPB.