In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378], the court held that to prevent the police from badgering a defendant into waiving previously asserted Miranda rights, no further interrogation may be undertaken unless the accused initiates communication with the police. (In re Bonnie H., supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 580-581.) However, courts have uniformly concluded this rule only applies when the suspect had been in continuous custody. When there is a break in custody of a sufficient length such that the suspect has time to consult with counsel or other advisors, the police may on their own initiative re-contact the suspect. This is so since the break in custody dissipates the inherently coercive effect of custody that is the basis for Miranda. In re Bonnie H., supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 579-585; People v. Scaffidi (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 145, 152, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167; Kyger v. Carlton (6th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 374, 380-381; Levy, Non-Continuous Custody and the Miranda-Edwards Rule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards (1994) 20 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 539.) U. S. v. Bautista (10th Cir. 1998) 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-1147; U. S. v. Barlow (5th Cir. 1994) 41 F.3d 935 at 935-945-946; U. S. v. Hines (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 255, 256-257; Dunkins v. Thigpen (11th Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 394, 397-398; McFadden v. Garraghty (4th Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 654, 661; U. S. ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman (7th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 117, 125; U. S. v. Skinner (9th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2d 1306, 1309; U. S. v. Drake (N.D.Ill. 1996) 934 F. Supp. 953, 962; U. S. v. Garey (D.Vt. 1993) 813 F. Supp. 1069, 1073, aff'd (2d Cir. 1994) 19 F.3d 8; People v. Trujillo (Colo. 1989) 773 P.2d 1086, 1091-1092; Gonzalez v. State (Fla.App. 3d Dist. 1984) 449 So. 2d 882, 886; Keys v. State (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1992) 606 So. 2d 669, 671- 672; State v. Bymes (Ga. 1989) 258 Ga. 813, 375 S.E.2d 41, 41-42; Wilson v.State (Ga. 1994) 264 Ga. 287, 444 S.E.2d 306, 309; State v. Norris (Kan. 1989) 244 Kan. 326, 768 P.2d 296, 301-302; State in Interest of Wells (La.App. 3d Cir. 1988) 532 So. 2d 191, 195-197; Com. v. Galford (Mass. 1992) 413 Mass. 364, 597 N.E.2d 410, 413-414; Willie v. State (Miss. 1991) 585 So. 2d 660, 666-667; State v. Kyger (Tenn.Crim.App. 1989) 787 S.W.2d 13, 24-25; State v. Furlough (Tenn.Crim.App. 1990) 797 S.W.2d 631, 640-641; Tipton v. Com. (Va.App. 1994) 18 Va. App. 832, 447 S.E.2d 539, 540-541; State v. McKenzie (W.Va. 1996) 197 W. Va. 429, 475 S.E.2d 521, 529-530. Some cases add an additional proviso to the break in custody rule. They require "a good faith release of custody, one that is not contrived or pretextual on the part of the police." People v. Bonnie H., supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at p. 584; People v. Scaffidi, supra, 11 Cal. App. 4th at p. 154; Dunkins v. Thigpen, supra, 854 F.2d at p. 397, fn. 6; Willie v. State, supra, 585 So. 2d at p. 667; People v. Trujillo, supra, 773 P.2d at p. 1092; Wilson v. State, supra, 573 So. 2d 77 at p. 79; People v. Trujillo, supra, 773 P.2d at p. 1090; States v. Bymes, supra, 375 S.E.2d at p. 42; Com. v. Galford, supra, 597 N.E.2d at p. 414, fn. 9; State v. Kyger, supra, 787 S.W.2d at p. 25, fn. 5. In none of these cases, however, was there an issue of pretextual release and no case has stated specifically what the term means. The origin of the requirement seems to be this footnote from Dunkins v. Thigpen, supra, 854 F.2d at page 397, footnote 6: "There is no contention that the break in custody was contrived or pretextual. We do not imply that our holding would be the same in the event of a contrived or pretextual break in custody."