In Elliott v. McCombs (1941) 17 Cal.2d 23, a land company deeded to Rice a parcel of land, "'except the south 30 feet thereof reserved for road purposes . . . .'" (17 Cal.2d at p. 26.) In concluding that the grantor reserved an easement rather than excepted title in the land, the court observed, quoting in part from Parks v. Gates (1921) 186 Cal. 151, 155, that "'there is a vast difference between a grant for purposes of "right of way" for a road and a grant of land "to be used for a road." The latter grant may be entirely consistent with the conveyance of a fee-simple title, as a road may be maintained as readily on land held in fee as under an easement, but the grant of land as a right of way recognizes nothing but an easement.' This rule was applied in Cooper v. Selig, 48 Cal.App. 228, where the court construed a deed conveying land to the city of Los Angeles for the purposes of a public road as passing the fee simple title. Under the same principle of construction, the language in the deed of the land company to Rice conveyed a fee-simple title to him with the reservation of an easement on the part of the grantor. " (Id. at p. 28.)