In Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, the California Supreme Court for the first time held that in some circumstances a plaintiff may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) as the result of witnessing an accident in which a third party was injured by the defendant's negligence. The Supreme Court explained, however, that "in order to limit the otherwise potential infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable." (Id. at p. 739.) The Supreme Court suggested that courts, when determining whether an emotional distress injury to a bystander is reasonably foreseeable, take into account the following three factors: "(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship." (Id. at pp. 740-741.) Twenty years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reexamine these factors in Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, a case involving an NIED claim brought by a passenger in an automobile in which his unmarried cohabitant, the driver, was killed. The court observed that over the years the factors "have been applied with varying degrees of flexibility." (Id. at p. 270.) But the court noted that " with regard to the third prong of the Dillon foreseeability test, i.e., whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related, the cases have refused to extend recovery to friends or distant relatives of the injured person." (Id. at p. 271.) Recognizing that some appellate courts in California and elsewhere had extended the Dillon holding "to allow recovery by a bystander who had the 'functional and emotional equivalent' of a nuclear family relationship with the injured person," the court "declined to follow the rationale of these decisions for to do so would result in the unreasonable extension of the scope of liability of a negligent actor." (Id. at p. 277.) Explaining that "the need to draw a bright line in this area of the law is essential," the court held that an unmarried cohabitant who claims to have a de facto marriage relationship with the injured person--just as other plaintiffs who claim to be de facto siblings, parents, grandparents, or children of an injured person--cannot state a cause of action for NIED. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court reiterated this need for a bright line in Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644. Although the narrow issue in that case was whether a mother who did not witness an accident in which her child was injured could recover NIED damages for the emotional distress she suffered when she arrived at the accident scene, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to address the "more important issue" of whether the factors identified in Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 "are adequate, or if they should be refined to create greater certainty in this area of the law." (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 647.) The court concluded that greater certainty was required. In reaching this conclusion, the court reiterated the considerations referred to in Elden, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pages 276-277, in emphasizing the need to "avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence" and to lessen the "burden on the courts in applying vaguely defined criteria." (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 664.) The court noted that "the issue resolved in Elden was too narrow to create the essential 'bright line' for all NIED actions." Thus, the court undertook to create a "bright line" for all NIED actions--"a clear rule under which liability may be determined," (ibid.) even though, as the court acknowledged, that "bright line" sometimes will produce arbitrary results. (Ibid.) The court held "that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress--a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances." (Id. at pp. 667-668.) In sum: In Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may have a cause of action for NIED for witnessing a third person injured by an accident caused by a defendant's negligence. Such an injury has to reasonably be foreseeable, and that foreseeability is based on three factors: "(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship." (Id. at pp. 740-741.) In Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, the court noted that "with regard to the third prong of the Dillon foreseeability test, i.e., whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related, the cases have refused to extend recovery to friends or distant relatives of the injured person." (Id. at p. 271.) Some appellate courts in California and elsewhere had extended the Dillon holding "to allow recovery by a bystander who had the 'functional and emotional equivalent' of a nuclear family relationship with the injured person," but the court in Elden "declined to follow the rationale of these decisions for to do so would result in the unreasonable extension of the scope of liability of a negligent actor." (Id. at p. 277.) The court said that "the need to draw a bright line in this area of the law is essential." The court held that an unmarried cohabitant who claims to have a de facto marriage relationship with the injured person-just as other plaintiffs who claim to be "de facto siblings, parents, grandparents or children" of an injured person-cannot state a cause of action for NIED. (Ibid.) In Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, the court reiterated the considerations referred to in Elden, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, but noted "that reliance on forseeability of injury alone in finding a duty . . . is not adequate." (Thing, at p. 664.) The court said there was a need to "avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence" and to lessen the "burden on the courts in applying vaguely defined criteria." (Ibid.) The court added that "the issue resolved in Elden was too narrow to create the essential 'bright line' for all NIED actions." Thus, the court endeavored to create a "bright line" for all NIED actions-"a clear rule under which liability may be determined" and observed that such a "bright line" sometimes will produce arbitrary results. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court had in prior cases seemed to exclude from NIED liability "the presence of only a distant relationship." (Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 741; Elden, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Second cousins are not "closely related." (Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 741; see Trapp v. Schuyler Construction (1983) 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1142, 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 first cousins who did not live together not "closely-related".) "Closely related" means "parents, siblings, children, or grandparents." (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p 668, fn. 10.) But it also must include spouses, and other non-blood relatives such as stepchildren, stepparents, and adopted children-"the immediate family unit." (Moon v. Guardian Postacute Services, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1011.) Second cousins are, however, related-but not closely related.