In Eric J. v. Betty M. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 715, Robert had been convicted of misdemeanor child annoyance and later of felony child molestation. ( Id., at p. 717-718.) After he was released on parole, he began a relationship with Helen, who had an eight-year-old son, Eric. He did not tell Helen about his criminal history. ( Id., at p. 718.) Robert's father and other members of Robert's family, who had varying degrees of knowledge regarding Robert's criminal history, allowed Robert into their homes as a guest at the same time as Eric. While in their homes, Robert molested Eric. ( Id., at pp. 718-720.) Helen sued Robert's family members for failing to warn her about his previous convictions. ( Id., at p. 717.) The trial court granted a nonsuit. ( Id., at p. 720.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that Robert was not a dangerous condition of the premises ( Eric J. v. Betty M., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 724-727) and that, absent a premises liability theory, the defendants had no duty to protect Helen or Eric from Robert ( id., at pp. 727-730). "The leitmotif of Helen's appellate argument is that Robert . . . was . . . to be treated as if he were a vicious pit bull, for whom a landowner might be liable just for allowing it on the landowner's property." ( Id., at p. 725.) The court concluded that "the legislative goal of rehabilitation -- embodied in the very fact that Robert was indeed released on parole -- cannot be squared, for purposes of landowner liability, with the assumption that Robert was the legal equivalent of a dangerous animal." (Ibid.) "If the Legislature was prepared to accept the possibility of Robert's rehabilitation, he cannot be equated with an inanimate, dangerous condition, or that of a dangerous animal. . . . Given that Robert's mere presence on the property cannot be considered a dangerous condition of the property, there is no basis for premises liability." ( Id., at p. 726.)