In Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318, by contrast, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that the phrase "personal property" used in the testator's will - which was drafted by an attorney - was intended to be limited to tangible personal property, excluding cash, bonds, notes and trust deeds. (6 Cal.3d at p. 323.) With respect to the appellant's reliance on the principle appellant advances here, the court stated: "Appellant cites Estate of Bourn supra 25 Cal.App.2d 590, 595 . . ., in which the court stated that 'where the will is drawn by a lawyer whose experience and competence are beyond question, the presumption that legal terms embodied in the will are used in their legal sense is all but conclusive.' (Accord, Estate of Northcutt supra 16 Cal.2d 683, 689 . . . .) But a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator (Prob. Code, 101 ), not the testator's attorney, and if through misunderstanding the testator and his attorney ascribe different meanings to the language of the will, that meaning intended by the testator must prevail." (6 Cal.3d at p. 324, fn. 13.) "'The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.' The presumption of a technical meaning established by section 106 now 21122 is subordinate to the dominant purpose of finding and effecting the testator's intent; it is an aid to be used in ascertaining that intent, not a tool by which the court frustrates the testator's objectives." ( Id. at p. 324-325.)