In People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, a jury convicted the defendant of willfully failing to register as a sex offender under former Penal Code section 290, subdivisions (a)(1), (g)(2) as amended by Statutes 1994, chapter 867, section 2.7, pages 4389, 4392. The defendant claimed he was unaware of the registration requirement and that no one had advised him of it, but the jury apparently did not believe him. When the defendant was charged with the underlying sex offenses, the complaint included an advisement that he would be required to register under section 290 if convicted. The defendant testified he had not seen the complaint and no one had read him the advisement. During voir dire prior to his pleas of no contest, when the prosecutor said he would be required to register under section 290, the defendant said he understood. He stipulated this exchange had occurred but claimed he did not remember what happened the day of his plea and did not recall if the judge told him he would have to register. He said his attorney advised him to answer yes to all questions unless the attorney told him otherwise. The defendant was sentenced to prison. Prior to his release on parole, he signed a document that said he had been notified of his duty to register pursuant to section 290 and set forth the registration requirements in force at the time, and the official who gave defendant this notice certified he had notified defendant of his duty to register. Although the defendant recalled signing documents, he testified he did not read the notice of registration requirement before signing and claimed no one read this document to him or explained his duty to register. Once released from prison, the defendant was deported to Mexico, but he returned illegally and lived in San Francisco for several months. He returned to Mexico but again returned illegally and moved to San Rafael in May 1995. He admitted he never registered as a sex offender when living in San Francisco or San Rafael. in September 1995, he was stopped for a traffic violation; unable to produce a driver's license, he initially gave the officer a false name and birth date. At trial, he testified he provided a false name because he did not want to be deported. In December 1995, an officer contacted the defendant and asked if he was aware of his obligation to register. When the defendant said he "wasn't really sure" (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 749) if he had been informed of the requirement, the officer explained it. The defendant admitted living in San Rafael for about three weeks and made an appointment to register a few days later; after he registered, he was arrested for parole violations. The Garcia court concluded "the court's instructions on 'willfulness' should have required proof that, in addition to being formally notified by the appropriate officers as required by section 290, in order to willfully violate section 290 the defendant must actually know of his duty to register," that "the court erred in giving an 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36), which on its face would allow the jury to convict defendant of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so," and that, "in the registration act context, the jury must find actual knowledge of the act's legal requirements." (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754.) The court explained that "the word 'willfully' implies a 'purpose or willingness' to make the omission. ( 7.) Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed. As stated in People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 334, 'the term "willfully" . . . imports a requirement that "the person knows what he is doing." Consistent with that requirement, and in appropriate cases, knowledge has been held to be a concomitant of willfulness. Fn. omitted.' Accordingly, a violation of section 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty to register." (Id. at p. 752.) The court then noted that "a jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement." (Ibid.) The Garcia court explained that "the actual knowledge test satisfies constitutional requirements. The high court has held that due process principles forbid applying the proscriptions of a registration act to one having no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge. (Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225.) As Lambert stated, 'Registration laws are common and their range is wide. Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the present ordinance is entirely different. Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover, circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking. . . . This appellant on first becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent. She could but suffer the consequences of the ordinance, namely, conviction with the imposition of heavy criminal penalties thereunder. We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand. . . . Where a person did not know of the duty to register, and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.' (Id. at pp. 229-230; see People v. Franklin (1999) 20 Cal.4th 249, 253, 975 P.2d 30.)" (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753.) In sum, the Garcia court observed that, although the trial court did not clearly omit the actual knowledge requirement, its instructions were potentially misleading. It further pointed out that during argument, when defense counsel started to argue defendant was unaware of the registration requirement, the prosecutor objected that the argument misstated the law, and the trial court agreed. Later, the prosecutor argued "lack of knowledge was not a valid defense" without objection. The high court concluded that, "on balance, the jury was erroneously led to believe that it did not have to find actual knowledge in order to find defendant guilty." (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 755.) Nevertheless, the court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that the defendant had "willfully" violated the registration requirement of section 290 only if he actually knew of his duty to register was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, since there was strong evidence the defendant knew of the registration requirements and the jury was instructed that it had to find he was informed of his duty to register. (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 755.) In People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 744, a jury convicted the defendant of willfully failing to register as a sex offender under former section 290. On appeal, the court concluded "the court's instructions on 'willfulness' should have required proof that, in addition to being formally notified by the appropriate officers as required by section 290, in order to willfully violate section 290 the defendant must actually know of his duty to register," that "the court erred in giving an 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36), which on its face would allow the jury to convict defendant of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so," and that, "in the registration act context, the jury must find actual knowledge of the act's legal requirements." (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 754, italics added.) The court explained that "the word 'willfully' implies a 'purpose or willingness' to make the omission. ( 7.) Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed. As stated in People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 289, 334, 'the term "willfully" . . . imports a requirement that "the person knows what he is doing." Consistent with that requirement, and in appropriate cases, knowledge has been held to be a concomitant of willfulness. Fn. omitted.' Accordingly, a violation of section 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty to register." (Id. at p. 752.) The court then noted that "a jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement." (Ibid.) The court then observed that "the actual knowledge test satisfies constitutional requirements. The high court has held that due process principles forbid applying the proscriptions of a registration act to one having 'no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.' (Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 227, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (Lambert ).) As Lambert stated, 'Registration laws are common and their range is wide. Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the present ordinance is entirely different. Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover, circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking. . . . This appellant on first becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent. She could but suffer the consequences of the ordinance, namely, conviction with the imposition of heavy criminal penalties thereunder. We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand. . . . Where a person did not know of the duty to register, and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.' (Id. at pp. 229-230; see People v. Franklin (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 249, 253.)" (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753.) The Garcia court summarized: "By making actual knowledge of the duty to register an element of a section 290 violation, we undoubtedly meet any due process limitations imposed by Lambert." (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 753.) Thus, Garcia's due process analysis was made in the context of construing former section 290. The analysis was necessary because that statute was a general intent offense that did not express a mens rea. (People v. Johnson (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 67, 72 "Penal Code section 290 simply prohibits the willful failure to register. It contains no other intent language and, therefore, is unquestionably a general intent offense. No specific intent or other mental state is required".) The Garcia court concluded: "As we recently stated, 'That the statute contains no reference to knowledge or other language of mens rea is not itself dispositive. . . . The requirement that, for a criminal conviction, the prosecution prove some form of guilty intent, knowledge, or criminal negligence is of such long standing and so fundamental to our criminal law that penal statutes will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it. "Generally, ' "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." . . .' In other words, there must be a union of act and wrongful intent, or criminal negligence. 'So basic is this requirement that it is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication.' " ' " (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 754.) In other words, a general intent statute that contains no reference to an element of mens rea will be construed to incorporate such an element.