In Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, the plaintiff-attorney and his client entered into a written contingency fee agreement in connection with a personal injury case. Before resolution of the case, the client discharged the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that under the contingency fee agreement, he was entitled to one-third of any money ultimately recovered in the personal injury case. The trial court sustained the client's demurrer to the declaratory relief action without leave to amend, and the Fracasse court affirmed on the ground the declaratory relief action was premature since the contingency, of the client prevailing in the personal injury action, had not yet occurred. (Fracasse v. Brent, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 792). In that case, it was held that "an attorney discharged with or without cause is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of discharge." ( Id. at p. 792.) The Welebir firm interprets this language to mean that the court should only look to see what settlement offers had been made at the time of the discharge, and to base any fee award on that: "The work performed up to that time had resulted in a $ 30,000.00 offer, and no more, that would have resulted in a one-third contingency fee of $ 10,000.00 had it been accepted. Since it was not accepted, the contingency did not occur, and the Welebir firm performed work which entitles it to a portion of the $ 10,000.00, earned from the ultimate acceptance of the driver's $ 30,000.00 policy limit. On the other hand, the Donahue firm did nothing that contributed in any way to the $ 225,000.00 settlement with the driver's employer, and therefore it should be entitled to none of the fee generated therefrom." While the simplicity of this argument has a certain facial appeal, it ignores Cazares v. Saenz (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 279, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 where the court held that "in seeking quantum meruit recovery on a partially performed contingent fee contract, the attorney-plaintiff is not limited to recovering his hourly rate on whatever time has been spent on the case but rather is entitled to an increased amount reflecting the value of the contingency factors as well as the delay in receiving payment for his services." ( Id. at p. 289.) The court pointed out that "when an attorney partially performs on a contingency fee contract, we already have the parties' agreement as to what was a reasonable fee for the entire case. If the trial court can determine what portion of the contract was performed, calculating the reasonable value of that partial performance becomes a relatively simple procedure." ( Id. at p. 288.)