In Freidberg v. Cox (1987) 197 Cal. App. 3d 381, Attorney Ingraham sued his former cocounsel, Attorney Freidberg, with respect to a fee division dispute. Ingraham asserted several causes of action, seeking $ 43,000 in attorney fees. Freidberg's motion for nonsuit was granted as to two of the three causes of action and the matter proceeded to trial on the reasonable value of services cause of action. Ingraham was awarded $ 12,900. Freidberg then filed a malicious prosecution action against Ingraham, claiming to have a favorable termination with respect to the two causes of action as to which nonsuit had been granted. Summary judgment was entered against Freidberg. The appellate court, in affirming, stated that there was one injury addressed in the underlying action and one claim for compensation for legal services. The underlying action terminated in favor of Ingraham, even though he recovered a lesser sum than he had sought. In discussing various authorities, the Freidberg court mentioned "'the rule that there must be a favorable termination of the entire action.' " (Id. at p. 387.) In sum, the attorney plaintiff in the underlying case sought to recover fees from the defendant, his former co-counsel, under theories of joint venture, reasonable value of services rendered (i.e., quantum meruit), and tortious interference with contract. (Id. at p. 383.) He won at trial on the reasonable-value-of-services theory--thereby recovering the fees he sought--and lost on the others, which the trial court dismissed. (Id. at pp. 383-384.) The theories on which the plaintiff won and those on which he lost were parts of a single cause of action, and an attempt to bring separate lawsuits based on them would have constituted claim-splitting. This meant the case was not terminated favorably for the defendant, who consequently could not bring a malicious prosecution suit based on the dismissed claims. (Id. at pp. 388-389.)