In Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 569, the California Supreme Court noted that under its previous holding in Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933) 217 Cal. 338, "the statute of limitations began to run at the time of disability and discovery of industrial causation" if the disability was caused by a latent specific injury, a series of continuous cumulative traumatic injuries, or cumulative injuries resulting in continuous exposure to harmful substances. (Fruehauf, supra at p. 574.) Fourteen years after Marsh, however, the Legislature enacted new date-of-injury provisions in sections 5411 and 5412. Fruehauf concluded that either type of cumulative injuries fell within section 5412's tolling of the date of injury until the employee either knew or reasonably should have known the disability was industrially related. (Id. at pp. 576-577.) Fruehauf raised, but left unanswered, the question whether Marsh's discovery rule applies to a latent specific injury since the Legislature's adoption of sections 5411 and 5412. According to Labor Code section 3208.1: "An injury may be either: (a) 'specific,' occurring as the result of one incident or exposure which causes disability or need for medical treatment; or (b) 'cumulative,' occurring as repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time, the combined effect of which causes any disability or need for medical treatment. The date of a cumulative injury shall be the date determined under Section 5412." Labor Code Section 5411 provides: "The date of injury, except in cases of occupational disease or cumulative injury, is that date during the employment on which occurred the alleged incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is claimed." Labor Code Section 5412 provides: "The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases or cumulative injuries is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused by his present or prior employment."