In Gardenhire v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 882, the decedent created a trust in which she was settlor, trustee, and income beneficiary during her lifetime. On her death, the trust assets were to be distributed to a named hospital, in trust for three individuals. The trust provided for revocation as follows: " 'While living, the Trustor may at any time and from time to time by written notice signed by the Trustor and delivered to the Trustee: A. Revoke or change the interest in any trust . . . of any beneficiary . . . . B. Amend any provision of this Declaration . . . . C. Revoke in whole or in part any trust or trusts created by or to be created pursuant to this Declaration. D. Withdraw all or any part of the Trust Estate.' " (Id. at p. 886.) Subsequently, the decedent executed a will. The will did not mention the trust, but stated it was the decedent's intent " 'to dispose of all real and personal property which I have the right to dispose of by Will . . . .' " (Ibid.) After the decedent's death, one of the beneficiaries under the will sought a determination that decedent had revoked the trust by will before she died and an order transferring legal title to the property from the trust to decedent's estate. Gardenhire, as trustee of the trust, filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that the decedent could not revoke the trust by a will. The trial court denied the motion, and Gardenhire petitioned for a writ of mandate. (Gardenhire, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 886-887.) The Court of Appeal denied the petition. In doing so, the Gardenhire court considered whether the revocation provision in the trust instrument authorized revocation by will. (Gardenhire, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 886-887.) The court concluded "that because the decedent did not limit or qualify the term 'written notice,' she authorized revocation via any writing that unambiguously manifested her intent to revoke, including a will. We find significant support for such broad latitude in the fact that she named herself the trustee. The trust allowed the decedent to revoke simply by giving herself written notice of her intent to do so. Since she could not be mistaken about her own intent no matter how she chose to manifest it in writing, the broad, unqualified language of the trust reasonably implies that she did not intend to restrict the form of written notice or the nature of the documents used to provide it. Rather, any writing that unambiguously manifested her intent would do." (Id. at p. 888.) The Court of Appeal in Gardenhire also rejected the argument that section 15401 required that a decedent specify in the trust document that the trust may be revoked by a later will. As the Gardenhire court explained: "Section 15401, subdivision (a)(1) allows a trust to provide any method of revocation. If the trust is silent and does not provide a method, then section 15401, subdivision (a)(2) allows revocation by a writing, other than a will, signed and delivered by the trustor to the trustee during the trustor's lifetime. If the trust is not silent and instead provides a method of revocation, then section 15401, subdivision (a)(2) is inapplicable. On its face, the statute does not require that a trust contain a specific and express provision authorizing revocation by will. Nor does subdivision (a)(2) represent a proviso to subdivision (a)(1) to the effect that although a trust may provide any method of revocation, if the trustor wants to allow revocation by will, then he or she may not use general language, such as written notice, that would necessarily encompass a will; rather the trustor must instead expressly specify that a will can constitute written notice. Moreover, we do not find the statute ambiguous concerning whether subdivision (a)(1) implicitly requires an express provision if a trustor wants to authorize revocation by will." (Gardenhire, supra. 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.)