In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, the defendant was charged with several counts of lewd conduct on a minor ( 288, subd. (a)) committed during various time periods, and the charges were supported by "generic" testimony from the child that did not distinguish between the individual acts occurring over an extended period of time. (People v. Jones, supra, at pp. 299-300, 321.) The Jones court overruled several appellate court decisions that had found such generic testimony violated the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict because it would be impossible for the jury to agree on specific acts that constituted the crime. (Id. at pp. 299-300, 308-309, 322.) The Jones court concluded that there was no constitutional impediment to allowing a jury to find a defendant guilty of more than one indistinguishable act as long as the victim's testimony described the nature of the sexual acts, the frequency of the acts, and the general time period for the acts. (Id. at pp. 316, 321.) Further, the court in Jones directed that the jury be given a modified unanimity instruction, stating: "When there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim." (Id. at p. 322.) The California Supreme Court established the criteria for determining the admissibility of generic evidence of molestation. (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 316.) It also addressed the circumstances under which a unanimity instruction should be given. (Id. at pp. 321-322.) In child molestation cases, generic testimony is sometimes presented, in which a victim describes multiple incidents that are not differentiated by dates, times, or places. A victim who has been repeatedly molested over a period of time "may have no practical way of recollecting, reconstructing, distinguishing or identifying by 'specific incidents or dates' all or even any such incidents." (Id. at p. 305.) The Jones court held that generic testimony can support a conviction if it describes (1) the kind of acts committed; (2) the number of acts committed; and (3) the general time period in which the acts occurred. (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 316.) All must be described with sufficient specificity to support each allegation. (Ibid.) If the foregoing criteria are met, and there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which allows a conviction if either (1) the jurors unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same specific act, or (2) the jurors unanimously agree the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim. (Id. at pp. 321-322.)