In Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, William Hewlett and Placer County challenged Squaw Valley's cutting of trees for a ski run in violation of the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act (Pub. Resources Code, 4511 et seq.), a conditional use permit and a temporary restraining order. (54 Cal.App.4th at p. 509) The Court rejected Squaw Valley's argument an injunction that prohibited them from utilizing a particular area and cutting trees was invalid because it was unrelated to the proven unfair business practices. (Id. at p. 541.) Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. was an action brought by the Placer County District Attorney, the Sierra Club, and an individual raising environmental concerns in connection with the development of ski runs in Squaw Valley. When litigation threatened the planned project, the developer resorted to self-help and cut more than 1,800 trees, some of them 300 to 600 years old. (Id. at p. 513.) The trial court ordered injunctive relief, which was upheld on appeal. The appellate court concluded that protection of the planning laws and authorities had been insufficient to prevent continued and repeated flagrant misconduct. The court stated: "Squaw Valley's actions destroyed an irreplaceable natural treasure without the benefit of proper environmental review. While that land obviously cannot be returned to its precut state, the injunctive relief ensures that similar land will not be similarly decimated." (Id. at p. 542.) The defendant obtained a conditional use permit from the county board of supervisors authorizing it to cut down trees to expand its skiing operations, provided it complied with certain conditions. The defendant failed to comply with several of the conditions. The court held the violation of the permit was an "unlawful" business practice for purposes of section 17200. The court explained that conditional use permits are part of local zoning laws and are the mechanism for enforcing zoning ordinances. Therefore, violation of a permit is also a violation of the zoning law. In addition, the county code provided that an unpermitted use of land within a zoning district was punishable by fine or imprisonment, thereby making such uses unlawful. (Hewlett, supra, at p. 532.) The defendant's ultimate conduct, the expansion of its ski facilities, was not unlawful and was not alleged to have had any anticompetitive effect. The trial court, in fact, had noted that "had Squaw Valley simply waited to cut these trees, it might have done so lawfully." (Id. at p. 516.) Yet the Court of Appeal held there was liability under the UCL based on the defendant's use of unlawful means, by cutting down the trees in violation of the conditional use permit. The "remedial power granted under Business and Professions Code section 17203 is 'extraordinarily broad. Probably because . . . unfair business practices can take many forms, the Legislature has given the courts the power to fashion remedies to prevent their "use or employment" in whatever context they may occur.' This power 'necessarily includes the authority to make orders to prevent such activities from occurring in the future. While an injunction against future violations might have some deterrent effect, it is only a partial remedy since it does not correct the consequences of past conduct. An "order which commands a party only to go and sin no more simply allows every violator a free bite at the apple." ' Injunctive relief 'may be as wide and diversified as the means employed in perpetration of the wrongdoing.' " (Id. at p. 540.) The record in Squaw Valley demonstrated "Squaw Valley's complete disregard for procedures designed to protect the environment and forest resources." (Id. at p. 541.) Thus, we found the broad injunctive relief proper. (Id. at p. 542.) In short, the operator of a ski resort cut 1,800 trees without an approved timber harvesting plan. In attempting to avoid liability for violation of Public Resources Code section 4581, the resort operator argued that because it eventually abandoned its effort to sell the cut trees, it had not engaged in any timber operations within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 4527. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "The phrase 'cutting . . . for commercial purposes' focuses on intent. The dictionary defines 'purpose' as 'something set up as an object or end to be obtained: INTENTION.' By utilizing the phrase 'cutting . . . for commercial purposes,' the Legislature focused on a party's intent at the time the trees were cut. Had the Legislature been more concerned with the ultimate use of the timber, it could easily have defined 'timber operations' as 'the sale of cut timber.' It did not do so." ( Hewlett, supra, 54 Cal. App. 4th at p. 524.)