In Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, the Court addressed an accident by an employee on his way to or from work. The Court acknowledged that respondeat superior liability, which is imposed regardless of the employer's fault and instead extends to risks incident to the enterprise, does not encompass risks posed by ordinary trips by employees traveling to and from work. (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 959-962.) However, Hinman also recognized that if such a trip confers "an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force," respondeat superior liability can extend to accidents during the trip. (Id. at p. 962.) Hinman reasoned that when an employer chooses to further its business interest by enlarging the geographical pool from which to draw its labor force by paying its employees for their commute, and this business benefit also creates a concomitant increased risk of accidents, the business benefited by the increased commute should also be responsible for the risks inherent in the choice of inducing increased commuting. Hinman summarized its holding by stating that when the employer and employee have, by agreeing to pay the employee for his or her travel time and expenses associated with commuting, "made the travel time part of the working day by their contract, the employer should be treated as such during the travel time." (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 962.) In that case, the plaintiff, a police officer, was standing on the center divider of a freeway inspecting a possible road hazard when he was struck by a car. The plaintiff filed suit against the driver's employer, contending the driver was acting within the scope of his employment while driving home. The driver was an elevator constructor's "helper" who was compensated for his round trip travel time and travel expense in driving his own vehicle to and from a particular jobsite. At the time of the incident, the driver was going home at the end of the workday. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in the employer's favor. The plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "the modern and proper basis of vicarious liability of the master is not his control or fault but the risks incident to his enterprise. 'We are not here looking for the master's fault but ... for risks that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise he has undertaken. ... Further, we are not looking for that which can and should reasonably be avoided, but with the more or less inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise.'" (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 960.) The court commented that "exceptions will be made to the 'going and coming' rule where the trip involves an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force. ... That the employee receives personal benefits is not determinative when there is also a benefit to the employer." (Id. at p. 962.) The court continued: "Where ... the employer and employee have made the travel time part of the working day by their contract, the employer should be treated as such during the travel time, and it follows that so long as the employee is using the time for the designated purpose, to return home, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable. It is unnecessary to determine the appropriate rule to be applied if the employee had used the time for other purposes." (Id. at p. 962.) In Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co. (1970) the defendant's employee was returning home from work at a jobsite when his vehicle struck a police officer standing in the center divider of a freeway. The court concluded the incidental benefit exception to the going and coming rule applied, because the employee was paid for his travel time and travel expenses, which benefited the employer because it could "reach out to a labor market in another area or to enlarge the available labor market by providing travel expenses and payment for travel time." (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 959, 962.) The court stated: "We are satisfied that, where, as here, the employer and employee have made the travel time part of the working day by their contract, the employer should be treated as such during the travel time, and it follows that so long as the employee is using the time for the designated purpose, to return home, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable. It is unnecessary to determine the appropriate rule to be applied if the employee had used the time for other purposes." (Id. at p. 962.) The material facts were undisputed and the court held the doctrine of respondeat superior applied as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 963.)