In Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, the parties were adjoining owners of residential property, and the plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering the removal of certain improvements, including a chain link fence, waterfalls, a koi pond and stone deck, a putting green, a sand trap, and a concrete block wall, which the defendants had constructed on the plaintiffs' property. (Hirshfield, at pp. 755-756.) The plaintiffs wanted access to this portion of their property in order to build a driveway and a greenhouse. (Hirshfield, at pp. 756-757.) The trial court denied the injunction and awarded defendants an equitable easement to the area in dispute. (Hirshfield, at p. 758.) In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court misapplied the relative hardship doctrine, Hirshfield outlined the appropriate test: "To deny an injunction, three factors must be present. First, the defendant must be innocent. That is, his or her encroachment must not be willful or negligent. The court should consider the parties' conduct to determine who is responsible for the dispute. Second, unless the rights of the public would be harmed, the court should grant the injunction if the plaintiff 'will suffer irreparable injury . . . regardless of the injury to defendant.' Third, the hardship to the defendant from granting the injunction 'must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment and this fact must clearly appear in the evidence and must be proved by the defendant. . . .'" (Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 759) Hirshfield also observed that "[o]verarching the analysis is the principle that since the [*20] defendant is the trespasser, he or she is the wrongdoer; therefore, 'doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the plaintiff.'" (Hirshfield, at p. 759, quoting Christensen, at p. 562.) After upholding the denial of injunctive relief, Hirshfield considered the plaintiffs' challenge to the trial court's award of an equitable easement to the defendants. (Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 764.) As Hirshfield explained, the refusal to order the removal of improvements on another's land constitutes "'a judicially created easement by a sort of non-statutory eminent domain.' However, the courts are not limited to judicial passivity as in merely refusing to enjoin an encroachment. Instead, in a proper case, the courts may exercise their equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner's land which will protect the encroacher's use." (Hirshfield, at pp. 764-765) This determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Hirshfield, at p. 771.) "Under that standard, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment and determine whether [*21] the court's decision '"falls within the permissible range of options set by the legal criteria."" (Hirshfield, at p. 771.) The trial court in Hirshfield exercised its equitable powers to grant relief in the form of a judgment for what it termed "an easement," giving the defendants an exclusive right to use the property in question, until such time as they sold their property or stopped living there. (Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757, 764) It did so by applying the doctrine of "balancing of conveniences" or "relative hardship," by which a trial court considers the parties' relative conduct and the hardship(s) each would face from the continuation/removal of the encroachment, and determines whether to enjoin a trespass caused by the encroachment or create a protective interest in equity to protect the neighbor's encroachment. (Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-761, 764-765) The appellate court in Hirshfield affirmed the trial court's creation of an exclusive easement to protect the neighbors' encroaching improvements (Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 772), noting with respect to the law of prescriptive easements, that "exclusive easements, while rare, are possible" (id. at p. 769, fn. 11). However, it also stated that the judgment did not violate the law of prescriptive easements, because the right of exclusive use created by the judgment was not in reality a prescriptive easement. Rather, the trial court had created the right of exclusive use through the employment of its equitable powers, to grant affirmative relief to an encroacher. (Id. at pp. 754-755.) The Court explained the relative hardship doctrine used in determining whether to grant an injunction to enjoin a trespass by encroachment on another's land. Under the doctrine, once the court determines that a trespass has occurred, the court performs an equitable balancing to determine whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the trespass, or whether to award damages instead. (Ibid.) "Overarching the analysis is the principle that since the defendant is the trespasser, he or she is the wrongdoer; therefore, 'doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the plaintiff.'" (Ibid.) For the court to deny an injunction, the defendant must prove three factors. First, the defendant must be innocent, i.e., his or her encroachment must not be willful or negligent. Second, unless the rights of the public would be harmed, the injunction should be granted "if the plaintiff 'will suffer irreparable injury . . . regardless of the injury to defendant.'" (Ibid.) Third, the hardship to the defendant if the injunction is granted "'must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment and this fact must clearly appear in the evidence and must be proved by the defendant. . . .'" (Ibid.) In Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) a chain link fence inaccurately delineated the boundary line between two residential parcels. (Id. at p. 755.) The owners of both parcels believed the fence accurately marked the legal boundary between their properties. (Ibid.) On that basis, the Schwartzes made numerous improvements to their parcel. (Ibid.) They extended the fence and added waterfalls, a pond, a stone deck, a putting green, and a sand trap. (Ibid.) They also constructed a reinforced concrete wall for safety purposes after a car careened through their yard. (Ibid.) A survey later revealed that portions of the property used by the Schwartzes belonged to the Hirshfields. (Id. at p. 756.) As a result, the Schwartzes' reinforced concrete wall, extensive underground water and electrical lines, and several motors that operated the waterfalls and the swimming pool recirculation (including a large motor installed underground in a concrete and iron enclosure) encroached on the Hirshfields' parcel. (Ibid.) The trial court found the cost of dismantling the encroachments would be significant (id. at p. 757) and, after trial, the Schwartzes were awarded an equitable easement over the Hirshfields' property and were ordered to pay the Hirshfields for its use. (Id. at p. 772.) In sum, plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's refusal to grant an injunction compelling defendants to remove certain encroachments on plaintiffs' residential property. (Id. at p. 754.) The trial court, sitting in equity, awarded an interest to the defendant to protect the defendant's use of the disputed land, which the trial court characterized as a "prescriptive easement." (Id. at pp. 754-755, 764, 766.) The appellate court found that, although this "protective interest" "was created in equity and was not a prescriptive easement," (id. at p. 755) the trial court was entitled to create it under its equity powers, and even to order the party receiving the interest to pay for it. (Id. at pp. 766-771.) The appellate court stated, "it matters not whether the . . . protective interest strictly comports with the law of prescriptive easements. Our task is to decide whether that interest--whatever its name--fell within the trial court's permissible range of options. We believe it did." (Id. at p. 771.) It concluded that the "decision, fashioned on the evidence and equities presented, and narrowly tailored to promote justice, will not be disturbed." (Id. at p. 772.)