In Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, the California Supreme Court restated the framework of sexual harassment law in California: "Like federal law, California law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. Originally enacted in 1980, Government Code section 12940 is part of the FEHA. It defines 'an unlawful employment practice' as an employer's refusal to hire, employ, or select for a training program leading to employment, any person because of that person's 'race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation.' Since 1985, the FEHA has prohibited sexual harassment of an employee. With respect to sexual harassment in the workplace the prohibited conduct ranges from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to, or tolerance of, unwelcome sexual advances to the creation of a work environment that is 'hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.' Thus, similar to the federal law's Title VII title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, California's FEHA 'recognizes two theories of liability for sexual harassment claims . . . ' . . . quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances . . . and hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment."" The Supreme Court further stated: "In construing California's FEHA, this court has held that the hostile work environment form of sexual harassment is actionable only when the harassing behavior is pervasive or severe. This limitation mirrors the federal courts' interpretation of Title VII. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under California's FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was 'severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.' There is no recovery 'for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial.' Courts that have construed federal and California employment discrimination laws have held that an employee seeking to prove sexual harassment based on no more than a few isolated incidents of harassing conduct must show that the conduct was 'severe in the extreme.' A single harassing incident involving 'physical violence or the threat thereof' may qualify as being severe in the extreme. Under California's FEHA, as under the federal law's Title VII, the existence of a hostile work environment depends upon 'the totality of the circumstances.' The Court said in Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 284, that 'to be actionable, "a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive . . . ."' Therefore, 'a plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or abusive will not prevail . . . if a reasonable person . . . , considering all the circumstances, would not share the same perception." (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044.) In Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at page 1039, the defendant was one of the trustees of the $ 350 million trust provided by the plaintiff's late ex-husband for their son. On her son's behalf, the plaintiff requested that the trust provide $ 160,000 for a two-month rental of a beach house. (Ibid.) The trustees unanimously rejected the request but agreed to provide $ 80,000 for a one-month rental. (Id. at pp. 1039-1040.) Two weeks later, the defendant contacted the plaintiff to invite her son to attend a private showing at a museum. (Id. at p. 1040.) During that conversation, the defendant called the plaintiff "'sweetie'" and "'honey,'" and said he thought of her "'in a special way, if you know what I mean.'" (Ibid.) After the plaintiff asked the defendant why the trustees had only authorized a one-month rental for the beach house, the defendant stated that he could be persuaded to cast his vote for an additional month if the plaintiff would be "'nice'" to him. (Ibid.) The defendant told the plaintiff: "'You know everyone always had a thing for you. You are one of the most beautiful, unattainable women in the world. Here's my home telephone number and call me when you're ready to give me what I want.'" (Ibid.) The plaintiff said the defendant's comments were "'crazy,'" to which the defendant responded, "'how crazy do you want to get?'" (Ibid.) That night, the plaintiff took her son to the museum where the defendant told her, "'I'll get you on your knees eventually. I'm going to fuck you one way or another.'" (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) The plaintiff sued the defendant for sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9 which provides for sexual harassment liability in the context of relationships between providers of professional services and their clients. (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1040, 1044-1046.) The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. (Id. at p. 1040.) On review, the California Supreme Court applied the same legal principles of sexual harassment law in the workplace to the plaintiff's claim for sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9, stating: "The Legislature intended to conform Civil Code section 51.9 to the California and federal laws pertaining to sexual harassment in the workplace." (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1048.) Applying those principles, the Supreme Court concluded, "here, defendant's sexually harassing conduct, as plaintiff has described it, was not 'pervasive' within the meaning of Civil Code section 51.9--that is, it was not so egregious as to alter the conditions of the underlying professional relationship. To be pervasive, the sexually harassing conduct must consist of 'more than a few isolated incidents.' That standard has not been met here. As we have explained, the alleged sexual harassment consisted only of comments defendant made to plaintiff during a single telephone conversation and a brief statement defendant made to plaintiff in person later that day during a social event at a museum." (Ibid.) The Supreme Court also concluded the defendant's conduct was not severe, stating: "Employment law acknowledges that an isolated incident of harassing conduct may qualify as 'severe' when it consists of 'a physical assault or the threat thereof.' . . . Although vulgar and highly offensive, the defendant's remark at the museum, which was made in the presence of other people attending a private showing at a museum, would not plausibly be construed by a reasonable trier of fact as a threat to commit a sexual assault on plaintiff. Most reasonably construed, defendant's comment was a threat, not of physical violence, but of financial retaliation: that he would use his power as a trustee to thwart plaintiff's requests to allocate funds from the trust established for her son Alex. But such a threat will not support a claim under Civil Code section 51.9 for the hostile environment form of sexual harassment, because it does not constitute 'severe' harassing conduct." (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1049.) In Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pages 1050-1051, the Supreme Court stated: "A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is: '"(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct."' A defendant's conduct is 'outrageous' when it is so '"'extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.'"' And the defendant's conduct must be '"'intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.'"'" In Hughes, the Supreme Court stated: "Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress '"does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."' If properly pled, a claim of sexual harassment can establish 'the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' Citation." (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) The court further stated, "with respect to the requirement that a plaintiff show severe emotional distress, this court has set a high bar. 'Severe emotional distress means "'emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.'" (Ibid.) In Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1035, the court concluded the defendant trustee's "inappropriate comments" (id. at p. 1051), which, as discussed ante, included the statement, "'I'll get you on your knees eventually. I'm going to fuck you one way or another'" (id. at p. 1040), "fall far short of conduct that is so 'outrageous' that it '"'exceeds all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community'"'" (id. at p. 1051).