In In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, a habeas petitioner in a capital case whose case was conducted by a court commissioner argued that "since neither he nor counsel specifically intended to enter a stipulation, none can be found." (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 98.) The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, "We have explained that 'under the 'tantamount stipulation' doctrine, . . . an implied stipulation arises from the parties' common intent that the subordinate officer hearing their case do things which, in fact, can only be done by a judge.' .) (Ibid.) The Court noted: "Here, it is uncontroverted that counsel participated fully and vigorously in the trial, at every point treating the commissioner as competent to rule on matters which rest solely in the discretion of a superior court judge. This conduct was a tacit recognition of, and reliance upon, the authority of the commissioner to act as a temporary judge." (Ibid.) The California Constitution directs that the "jurisdiction of a court commissioner, or any other temporary judge, to try a cause derives from the parties' stipulation. Accordingly, "in the absence of a proper stipulation," the judgment entered by a court commissioner is void. (Ibid.) However, the Supreme Court has ratified "the doctrine of tantamount stipulation," by which "a valid stipulation for purposes of the constitutional provision may arise as a result of the conduct of the parties. . . . Conduct short of an express oral or written stipulation may be tantamount to a stipulation that a court commissioner may sit as a temporary judge." (Id. at pp. 91-92.) Moreover, under the doctrine of tantamount stipulation "not only is an express stipulation by the client unnecessary, but . . . counsel's conduct may provide the basis for the tantamount stipulation." (Id. at p. 93.) The Court concluded that an attorney has the right to stipulate that trial be conducted by a court commissioner or temporary judge rather than a judge, rejecting the defendant's claim that he had a fundamental right to make such a decision. Said the court: "In the civil context, the attorney has authority to enter into stipulations binding on the client in all matters of procedure, though he or she may not stipulate in a manner to '"impair the client's substantial rights or the cause of action itself."' Thus the attorney cannot without authorization settle the suit, stipulate to a matter that would eliminate an essential defense, agree to entry of a default judgment, or stipulate to nominal damages." (Id. at p. 94.) The California Supreme Court rejected a criminal defendant's challenge that his capital case had been improperly heard before a commissioner as a temporary judge because there was no express stipulation. (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 98, 100.) The court stated: "Here, it is uncontroverted that counsel participated fully and vigorously in the trial, at every point treating the commissioner as competent to rule on matters which rest solely in the discretion of a superior court judge. This conduct was a tacit recognition of, and reliance upon, the authority of the commissioner to act as a temporary judge." (Id. at p. 98.) The Court also noted in Horton: "Our state Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution, also contemplates in the interest of judicial efficiency that the ranks of the regular judiciary may be extended from time to time by qualified temporary judges who serve as officers of the superior court. This community interest in judicial efficiency is of constitutional magnitude, and somewhat tempers the individual's interest in trial by a regularly appointed judge." (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 97.) In sum: A court commissioner conducted the trial in a capital case without objection. (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 86.) In a habeas petition, the defendant argued "the right to be tried by a regularly appointed or elected superior court judge is a fundamental and personal one that can only be waived after full admonition of the defendant and after he has entered an express waiver of the right on the record." (Id. at p. 86.) In the alternative, he argued "since neither he nor counsel specifically intended to enter a stipulation, none can be found." (Id. at p. 98.) The court disagreed. "Although the original constitutional language providing for temporary judges, as well as the current language of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaks of a written stipulation of the parties litigant, we have ratified a line of cases recognizing that a valid stipulation for purposes of the constitutional provision may arise as a result of the conduct of the parties. These cases hold that conduct short of an express oral or written stipulation may be tantamount to a stipulation that a court commissioner may sit as a temporary judge. " (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 91.) Horton found it "uncontroverted" the defendant participated "fully and vigorously in the trial, at every point treating the commissioner as competent to rule on matters which rest solely in the discretion of a superior court judge. This conduct was a tacit recognition of, and reliance upon, the authority of the commissioner to act as a temporary judge." (Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 98.)